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TIME TO DECIDE? THE LAWS GOVERNING 
MOTHERS' CONSENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF 
THEIR NEWBORN INFANTS 
ELIZABETH J. SAMUELS· 
Adoption in the United States is a complex patchwork of law and 
practice that involves payments of nearly two billion dollars annually 
in fees and expenses. The adoptions that involve domestically born, 
voluntarily placed infants raise unique issues. In these as in all 
adoptions involving parental consent, two generally accepted goals of 
ethical and humane practice are first, avoiding unnecessary separation 
offamilies by ensuring that birth parents make informed and deliberate 
decisions and second, protecting the finality of placements. The two 
goals are ideally complementary, but in the case of domestic infant 
adoptions, there is a danger that pressure to increase the number of 
adoptions is causing the second one to eclipse the first. 
This Article surveys the present day "adoption market" in which 
these adoptions take place and in which demand for adoptable infants 
far exceeds supply. It examines best practices for conducting the 
adoptions, reviews the state laws governing mothers' consents to the 
adoption of their newborn infants, and evaluates those laws in light of 
cases around the country in which mothers have sought, usually 
unsuccessfully, to set aside their consents. Most state laws, in contrast 
to the laws of many other countries, provide that consent may be given 
and become irrevocable almost immediately after the child's birth. 
Under the laws in more than half the states, irrevocable consent can be 
established in fewer than four days. The Article concludes that the laws 
of most states do not sufficiently promote mothers' deliberate 
decisionmaking. It recommends laws that make it more likely mothers 
will be offered skilled, unbiased counseling; will receive clear, complete 
information; and will have adequate time to decide. 
• Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., University of 
Chicago School of Law, 1980; A.B., Harvard College, 1975. I would like to thank the 
University of Baltimore Educational Foundation, which provided financial support; the 
University of Baltimore Law Library for its superb services; student Sarah Bruce for her 
outstanding research assistance; and the many birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees who 
have generously shared their experiences of and their wisdom concerning adoption. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
(1) The Act protects minor children against unnecessary separation 
from their birth parents . ... 
(2) The Act protects birth parents from unwarranted termination of 
their parental rights. . .. The Act attempts to ensure that a decision by 
a birth parent to relinquish a minor child and consent to the child's 
adoption is informed and voluntary. Once that decision is made, 
however, ... [it is] final and irrevocable. 1 
Preface to the Uniform Adoption Act of I 994 
Even as the senior justice on this court with fzfteen years experience as 
an associate professor at a law school, I am allowed three days to 
cancel a contract to purchase consumer goods signed at my home-a 
document that is far less important than [an affidavit of relinquishment 
by a newborn infant's young mother] and a setting that is far more 
comfortable than a hospital. 2 
Justice Tom Rickhoff, Texas Court of Appeals 
All successful adoptive families may, like all Tolstoy's happy families, 
resemble one another. They each create a new set of lifelong kinship ties. 
Adoptive families are formed, however, in many different ways. Stepparent 
adoptions, the adoption of children from foreign countries, the adoption of 
children out of foster care, and the adoption of healthy infants born in this 
country are distinct social and legal events. We must acknowledge the 
differences among these types of adoption in order to formulate sensible 
policies and enact beneficial laws. 
While children in foster care who cannot return to their families face a 
critical shortage of permanent homes,3 the prospective adopters of voluntarily 
1. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 14 (1994); see also MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAW § 5-303(b) (1999) ("The purposes of this subtitle are to: ... (2) protect children from 
unnecessary separation from their natural parents; ... [and] (4) protect natural parents from 
making a hurried or ill-considered decision to give up a child .... "); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-
100(b) (2003) ("The primary purpose of this Chapter is to advance the welfare of minors by 
(i) protecting minors from unnecessary separation from their original parents. . .. Secondary 
purposes of this Chapter are (i) to protect biological parents from ill-advised decisions to 
relinquish a child or consent to the child's adoption .... "); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-101 
(2001) (including, among its primary purposes, seeking "to ensure ... that [c]hildren are 
removed from the homes of their parents or guardians only when that becomes the only 
alternative [that] is consistent with the best interest of the child"). 
2. In re Baby Girl Bruno, 974 S.W.2d 401, 406 n.2 (Tex. App. 1998) (Rickhoff, J., 
concurring). 
3. See 2 MADELYN FREUNDLICH, ADoPTION AND ETHICS 67-68 (2000); U.S. Dep't of 
Health & Human Servs., Admin. for Children & Families, National Campaign Urges 
Americans to Adopt, CHILDREN'S BUREAU EXPRESS (June 2004), at http://cbexpress.acf.hhs. 
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placed "domestic white infants" have faced an acute shortage of available 
children.4 This Article focuses on the laws governing mothers' consentsS to 
the adoption of their newborn infants. Its focus is on mothers rather than on 
both parents, not because the law governing the consent of fathers is less 
important or less problematic,6 but because mothers' consents involve distinct 
considerations and because recent scholarship has examined the law governing 
mothers' consents much less than it has considered the legal treatment of 
fathers whose children are placed for adoption. 
Two principal and widely accepted goals of domestic infant adoption are 
(1) preventing the unnecessary separation of family members by ensuring that 
birth parents make informed and deliberate decisions and (2) protecting the 
finality of adoptive placements.7 Ideally, these goals are complementary and 
can be balanced. There is, however, a danger of the second goal eclipsing the 
first. Many state laws appear to value an increase in infant adoptions over the 
goal of encouraging careful deliberation. Most domestic infant adoptions 
involve powerful market forces as well as powerful emotional pressures,s and 
they occur in the context of a national commitment to encourage adoptions of 
older children and children with special needs.9 Infant adoption service 
gov/articles.cfm?article_id=819 (noting that 129,000 of more than 500,000 children in foster 
care are "waiting for someone to adopt them"). 
4. See infra Part III. 
5. The focus of the Article is on both "consent," the term commonly used to refer to a 
mother's agreement to the child's adoption by designated adoptive parents, and 
"relinquishment," the term commonly used to refer to a mother's surrender of parental rights 
to an adoption agency that will place the child with adoptive parents selected either by the 
mother or the agency. 
6. A number of state consent laws treat either all fathers or certain classes of fathers 
differently than mothers. For example, some or all fathers, but not mothers, are permitted to 
consent to adoption before the birth of the child in Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Nevada, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE app. I-A 
(Joan Heifetz Hollinger et al. eds., 2004); Nat' I Council for Adoption, Resources: State Laws, 
at http://infantadopt.org/statelaws.htrnl(lastvisitedMay 10,2005). More significantly, because 
mothers are usually identified and available, they are not the usual subjects of a whole complex 
of constitutional, statutory, and case law that pertains to identifying, locating, and notifying 
fathers. 
7. See infra Parts IV-V. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(l)(8) (2000); 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 73-76; 
Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 683 (2001). According to the Child Welfare League of America (CWLA), 
[w]ith the passage of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997, renewed 
emphasis has been brought to adoption, with federal requirements related to expedited 
termination of parental rights, reasonable efforts to secure adoptive families for children 
for whom adoption is the plan, and adoption incentive payments to states that significantly 
increase the number oflegalized adoptions for children in their out-of-home care system. 
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CWLA STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR ADOPTION 
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providers' livelihoods or profits generally depend on successfully arranging 
adoptions for their primary clients, typically relatively prosperous, well-
established, and socially favored married couples who have suffered agonies 
of infertility and who, in their efforts to adopt, often face great difficulties and 
pay high fees. lo Mothers in the stressful situations that lead them to consider 
placing their infants for adoption are not an organized group and are relatively 
powerless and socially disfavored. II 
This Article surveys and evaluates the laws governing mothers' consents 
in light of the numerous reported cases in which mothers have attempted to set 
aside their consents. It also seeks to identify the legal rules that most 
effectively create incentives for the kind of "best practices" in adoption 
services that promote deliberate decisionmaking and finality-in other words, 
practices that promote ethical and humane adoptions. The state laws that 
currently govern mothers' consents to adoption of newborn infants vary 
widely but fall into a few basic types. As a general rule, consents may be set 
aside in all jurisdictions for fraud, duress, or undue influence, usually for 
limited periods of time after consent has been given or after the adoption has 
been granted. In the absence of such wrongdoing, which is difficult to 
establish, 12 mothers in many states are afforded a limited opportunity to revoke 
their consent. The state laws governing consent follow a number of different 
patterns. Under a few states' laws, mothers may sign consents before the birth 
but then have a brief period of time after the birth to revoke consent. Under 
some state laws, consents may be signed any time after the birth but are then 
revocable for a specified period. Under other state laws, consents may not be 
signed until a specified number of hours or days after birth and are then 
revocable for a specified period. A different group of state laws provides that 
irrevocable consents may be signed at any time after birth. Other state laws 
provide that irrevocable consents may be signed after a specified number of 
hours or days after birth. 13 
Many of these state laws do not ensure that best practices will be followed 
in all infant adoptions. Evidence of this fact can be found, sadly, in what one 
court has referred to as "the multitude of cases in which a natural parent seeks 
to regain her child.,,14 These cases reveal an absence of the skilled and 
unbiased counseling that would provide mothers with sufficient information 
and support to make deliberate and final decisions. They also reveal a lack of 
adequate legal advice. Perhaps most starkly, they highlight the very short 
SERVICES FOR ABUSED OR NEGLECTED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 4-5 (rev. ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter CWLA STANDARDS]. 
10. See infra Part III. 
II. See infra Part IV. 
12. See Katherine G. Thompson, Contested Adoptions: Strategy of the Case, in 2 
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 8.02( I )(b). 
13. See infra Part V. 
14. In re Adoption ofBGD, 719 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Wyo. 1986). 
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periods of time that are provided under a majority of state laws after which a 
mother's consent may effectively be given and become irrevocable. IS In a 
number of other countries-including a majority of European countries and 
Australian states~onsent may not be given or does not become final for a 
period of approximately six weeks. 16 In approximately half the U.S. states, 
however, irrevocable consent can be established in as short a period as less 
than four days after birth; in approximately ten percent of the states, it can be 
established in less than seven days after birth; and in approximately fifteen 
percent of the states, it can be established in less than two weeks after birth. 17 
In Part II, this Article introduces the issues it will address by relating the 
story of one recent case in which a mother unsuccessfully tried to revoke her 
consent and contest her child's adoption. Part III surveys the present-day 
adoption market in which domestic infant adoptions take place, and Part IV 
examines best practices for conducting infant adoptions. After a review of 
applicable state laws in Part V, Part VI analyzes reported cases in which 
mothers have sought to revoke their consent. Finally, Part VII considers the 
most practicable legal rules for promoting ethical and humane adoptions. 
II. A CONTESTED ADOPTION 
In a sense, the social and legal systems have failed in any case in which 
an infant's mother asks a court to overturn her consent. If the first purpose of 
adoption is to provide a home for a child, rather than a child for adults who 
wish to adopt, and if the mother is not unfit and wishes to raise her child, how 
are we to understand such a contest? If a mother has had sufficient 
information, support, and time to make and come to terms with a firm 
decision, why is she seeking to revoke her consent? What kinds of 
circumstances lead to these contests? Some answers to these questions are 
suggested by the facts of a recent case in which a mother unsuccessfully 
pursued her claim through the Kansas court system and in a petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. How did her situation arise 
under Kansas law, and how might it have developed in a different kind oflegal 
system? 
The mother who placed her child for adoption in this case was neither very 
young nor childless. She was a twenty-nine-year-old pharmacist, a single 
mother raising one child, when she became pregnant with a second. 18 
According to the intermediate appellate court's unpublished opinion in In re 
15. See infra Part V. 
16. See infra notes 56-61. 
17. See infra Part V. 
18. In re Baby Girl W., No. 87,291, slip op. at 2 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 5,2002), ajJ'd,43 
P.3d 902 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (mem. decision), cert. denied, Willson v. Catholic Charities Inc., 
538 U.S. 945 (2003). 
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Adoption of Baby Girl w., 19 she became pregnant in early 2000 and sought 
counseling at Catholic Charities.20 During periodic counseling sessions from 
May through July, she and a counselor discussed the possibility of-but did 
not make plans for-adoption.21 The mother apparently felt like "the black 
sheep" of her family.22 She was concerned about the father's lack of 
involvement as well as how to tell her family she was pregnant.23 A friend 
told her in August that the friend's brother-in-law and his wife hoped to 
adopt. 24 The mother spoke with the wife, permitted Catholic Charities to 
speak with the couple, and later met with the couple on two occasions, but she 
remained undecided about whether to place the child for adoption.25 In late 
September she had a brief meeting with an attorney provided by Catholic 
Charities.26 She was still undecided when she entered the hospital on 
December 20.27 
Baby Girl W. was born that evening, and the next day the mother told a 
hospital social worker she still had not reached a decision.28 She expressed 
concern both about her mother's disapproval of adoption and about her 
attempts to reconcile with the father of her older child. The hospital social 
worker advised her that foster care was available to give her more time to 
decide.29 The following day, on which she was scheduled to be released from 
the hospital, she was told she had to reach a decision before five p.m., at which 
time Catholic Charities would close for the weekend.30 She thereupon 
authorized the Catholic Charities counselor to come to the hospital to conduct 
the relinquishment process.31 The counselor, who up to this time had assumed 
the mother had decided against adoption, arrived in the late afternoon; 
discussed the mother's situation with her, including the grandmother's 
disapproval of placing the child; and presented her with the paperwork, which 
she then signed in the presence of a notary public.32 That evening the adoptive 
parents left the hospital with the child.33 In court, the counselor testified that 
the mother understood her relinquishment was irrevocable.34 The mother 
19. No. 87,291, slip op. (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 5,2002). 
20. Id. at 2-3. 
21. Id. at 3. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. 
24. Id. at 4. 
25. Id. at 4-5. 
26. Id. at 5. 
27. Id. at 6. 
28. Id. at 6-7. 
29. Id. at 7. 
30. Id. at 7-8. 
31. Id. at 8. 
32. Id. at 8-9. 
33. Id. at 11. 
34. Id. at 8-9. 
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maintained that she was weak and tired from not having slept for twenty-four 
hours and that she was affected by Percocet, the narcotic she was taking for 
pain.35 She testified she did not recall whether she was told the consent was 
irrevocable.36 
At home the next day, December 23, the mother decided she had made a 
mistake and, according to her testimony, called but was unable to reach 
Catholic Charities.37 That evening she called the prospective adoptive parents 
to say she had made a mistake and did not want to place the child for 
adoption.38 On January 3, a Catholic Charities representative signed the 
relinquishment document, giving the agency the power to place the child and 
consent to the adoption.39 On January 26, the mother filed a petition to set 
aside her relinquishment,40 a petition that she pursued unsuccessfully through 
the Kansas courts41 and in a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.42 
If these circumstances had arisen before 1968, the mother would have 
been able to revoke her consent at any time before the court granted the 
adoption.43 The Kansas courts had established this rule, as had many of the 
state courts that had considered the question.44 In Kansas between 1968 and 
1990, under a statutory provision, she could have revoked her consent until the 
adoptive parents filed it in court, unless she had acknowledged her consent 
before a judge, in which case it would have been irrevocable.45 During that 
period, written consents, once filed in court, were revocable only if the 
consenting party could prove before the final decree that consent "was not 
freely and voluntarily given.'>46 Under the Kansas law passed in 1990, which 
applied in this case, the mother's consent would have been voidable if she had 
given it within twelve hours of the baby's birth, rather than two days after the 
birth, or if she could have proved "by clear and convincing evidence that the 
consent was not freely and voluntarily given.'>47 
35. Id. at 9. 
36. Id. at 9-10. 
37. Id. at II. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 18. 
40. Id. at II. 
41. Id. at 24. 
42. Willson v. Catholic Charities Inc., 538 U.S. 945 (2003). 
43. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 739 P.2d 1,4 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987); Harvey S. 
Berenson, Survey of Kansas Law: Family Law, 17 KAN. L. REv. 349, 352 (1969). 
44. See In re Adoption of Thompson, 283 P.2d 493, 498 (Kan. 1955). 
45. Berenson, supra note 43, at 352 n.17. 
46. Baby Girl H., 739 P.2d at 4. 
47. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2114, 59-2116 (1994). In a 1984 case, the mother gave her 
consent the day of the birth and three days later told the attorney who was representing both her 
and the adoptive parents that she wanted the child back. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Irons, 684 
P.2d 332, 335, 337 (Kan. 1984). The court shifted the burden of proving voluntariness to the 
adopters on the grounds that the mother was in a confidential relationship with both her doctor 
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The legislature passed the applicable 1990 law in response to a 1987 case 
in which an eighteen-year-old mother gave her consent before a judge at the 
hospital approximately one hour after birth.48 In that case, the Kansas Court 
of Appeals suggested that the legislature consider adding a waiting period 
during which consent would not be valid.49 In another case that arose after this 
law was enacted, a young woman became pregnant while in high school, had 
no counseling before she entered the hospital, and had no independent legal 
representation, which is required in Kansas for birth parents who are minors. 50 
She gave her consent twelve hours and fifteen minutes after the birth of her 
child. 51 The next day she decided to revoke her consent and delegated her 
mother to ask the prospective adoptive mother to return the child. 52 
Ultimately, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of her 
motion to revoke her consent. 53 
How might this mother's and Baby Girl W's mother's situations have 
developed if they had lived in a jurisdiction in which the law had been 
designed to ensure that mothers' decisions are well informed, deliberate, and 
final? In the Australian state of Victoria, the applicable law falls near the 
opposite end of the spectrum from Kansas law and the laws of many other 
U.S. states. While domestic infant adoptions in the United States are generally 
very costly for the adoptive parents,54 in Victoria adoptive parents pay only the 
nominal cost of the court adoption order. 55 The prospective adoptive parents 
do not have contact with the mother before the birth,56 and the mother may not 
and the attorney and that there were suspicious circumstances because the attorney was the 
doctor's daughter. Id. at 339-40. The court nonetheless found that the mother's consent was 
voluntary, explaining that if she felt unduly pressured by the doctor's continual encouragement 
to place the child, she could have sought medical services from another physician and could 
have sought advice from family and friends. Id. at 341. 
48. See Baby Girl H., 739 P.2d at 2. 
49. Id. at 7. 
50. In re Adoption of Baby Girl T., 21 P.3d 581, 585-87 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). 
51. Seeid. at 587. 
52. Id. 
53. See id. at 587,592. 
54. See infra Part III. 
55. Costs of domestic infant adoptions vary among the Australian states but are generally 
a small fraction of the costs in the United States. For example, in Queensland, prospective 
adoptive parents pay a $53 "expression of interest" fee and a $487.30 "assessment fee." Dep't 
of Child Safety, Queens!. Gov't, General Children's Adoption Program, at http://www. 
childsafety.qld.gov.auladoption/queensland/generalproglindex.html (last updated Sept. 23, 
2004). In South Australia, the costs involved are a $379 "when lodging expression of interest" 
fee, a $500 application fee, a $500 assessment fee, and a $250 fee upon placement. Adoption 
& Family Info. Serv., Gov't of S. Austl., 9.3 Fee Stroctures, at http://www.adoptions. 
sa.gov.aulSection9/9 _ 3 _info _ contact.htm (last modified Mar. 7, 2005). 
56. EVELYN ROBINSON, CURRENT ADOPTION POLICY AND PRACTICE: A COMPARISON 
BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA 2 (Jan. 2004), at http://www.clovapublications. 
com/comparison. pdf. 
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give legally binding consent until the child is fifteen days old. 57 After giving 
consent, she has a twenty-eight-day period in which she may withdraw 
consent, a period similar to the periods available in all Australian 
jurisdictions. 58 
A number of countries do not have revocation periods but impose much 
longer periods than Victoria's before which consent may not be accepted, 
periods ranging from six weeks to two months. France, for example, provides 
for a period of two months.59 Six weeks is the specified minimum period 
under the European Convention on the Adoption of Children, which has been 
ratified by eighteen nations.60 When changes to the thirty-five-year-old 
57. See Adoption Act, 1984, § 42(2)-(3) (Vict.). 
58. Jd. § 41(1)(a). She may also extend the period an additionalfourteen days. Id. Other 
Australian states and territories have similar periods for withdrawing consent. A Queensland 
government review of adoption legislation reports that its revocation period is thirty days and 
"[a]ll other Australian jurisdictions have a 25, 28 or 30 day (as in Queensland) revocation 
period." DEP'T OF CHIlli SAFETY, QUEENSL. GOV'T, ADOPTION LEGISLATION REVIEW 73, at 
http://www.childsafety.qld.gov.auladoptionlpublications/documents/cp_full.pdf (last visited 
May 10, 2005). Queensland law provides that 
an adoption order cannot be made if the birth mother signed the consent documents within 
five days of giving birth, unless the Director-General is satisfied that the mother was in a 
fit condition to give the consent. . .. [Nevertheless,] this provision is never used and 
consents are not taken during that five day period. Most consents are usually signed 
between 10 and 14 days following the child's birth. 
Jd. at 69. With respect to other Australian jurisdictions, 
[t]he period after birth during which parents cannot give consent is longer in all other 
Australian jurisdictions than it is in Queensland. The most recent legislation, the Adoption 
Act 2000 (NSW), states that parents' consent to a child's adoption cannot be given until 
30 days after the birth of the child and 14 days after the person is given the consent 
documents and mandatory written information. The New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission in its Report on the Review of the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NWS) 
considered that: "a 30 day hiatus after the birth of the child will mean that birth parents 
are truly able to experience the impact of separation from their babies, and ultimately to 
make a more informed and realistic decision." 
1d. at 70 (citation omitted). 
59. COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN COMM. ON LEGAL CO-OPERATION, FINAL ACTIVITY 
REpORT: ADOPTION 42 (2004) [hereinafter FINAL ACTIVITY REpORT]. Other examples include 
Norway (two months) and Ukraine (two months). Id. at 61,82. Under Romanian law, consent 
may not be given until forty-five days after birth. MICHAEL W. AMBROSE & ANNA MARY 
COBURN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV. IN ROM., REpORT ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION IN 
ROMANIA 15 (2001). 
60. Council of Eur., Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of the European Convention 
on the Adoption of Children, available at http://conventions.coe.intlTreatyIEN/cadre 
principal.htm (last visited May 10, 2005). Article 5(4) of the European Convention on the 
Adoption of Children provides: 
A mother's consent to the adoption of her child shall not be accepted unless it is given at 
such time after the birth of the child, not being less than six weeks, as may be prescribed 
by law, or, if no such time has been prescribed, at such time as, in the opinion of the 
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Convention were recently suggested in a report by the Council of Europe's 
European Committee on Legal Co-operation, no change to this period was 
suggested.61 
Under Victoria's law, Baby Girl W's mother, in addition to having had 
more time, would have had to give her consent in the presence of a court 
official or a person designated either by the government or an approved 
government-funded agency.62 At least seven days before giving her consent, 
she would have had to receive counseling by a person approved by the 
Secretary of the Department of Human Services or an approved government-
funded agency.63 She would also have had to receive from that counselor the 
"names and addresses of organizations that provide family support services," 
as well as written information concerning "the effect of an adoption order" and 
"alternatives to adoption. ,,64 
To evaluate legal approaches as diverse as those of Kansas and Victoria, 
and to consider what approaches best promote the goals of both deliberate 
decisionmaking and finality in the United States, it is necessary to examine 
"the adoption market," the standards of best practices in adoption services, the 
variety of state laws governing consent by mothers, and the recurring problems 
in practice suggested by reported cases around the country. 
III. THE ADOPTION MARKET 
While adoption alters and hopefully enhances the lives of children and 
families, it is also a nearly $2 billion-a-year u.s. business that is 
growing fast. 65 
Sue Zeidler, Reuters News Service 
People assume that adoption is a benevolent, philanthropic response to 
the needs of orphans, but it's not always. In some ways, it's just 
competent authority, will have enabled her to recover sufficiently from the effects of 
giving birth to the child. 
European Convention on the Adoption of Children, Apr. 26, 1967, art. 5(4), 634 U.N. T.S. 256, 
available at http://conventions.coe.intiTreatyIEN/cadreprincipal.htm. 
For examples of national laws, see Adoption and Children Act, 2002, c. 3, § 52(3) (Eng.) 
(England and Wales, six weeks); FINAL ACTIVITY REpORT, supra note 59, at 31 (Croatia, six 
weeks); ZdeIika Knilickova, Adoption in the Czech Republic: Reform in the Light of the Child 
Welfare Laws, in THE INT'L SURV. OF FAM. L. 133 (Andrew Bainham ed., 2003) (Czech 
Republic, six weeks). 
61. FINAL ACTIVITY REpORT, supra note 59, at 10-19. 
62. See Adoption Act, 1984, § 34(1)-(2) (Vict.). 
63. Id. § 35(1). 
64. Id. Under special circumstances, the counselor may decide that a period ofless than 
seven days but no less than twenty-four hours is appropriate. See id. § 35(2). 
65. Sue Zeidler, Internet Transforms U.S. Adoption Process, REUTERS, May 21, 2004. 
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another giant industry in which people see a way to get rich. 66 
Maureen Hogan, Executive Director, National Adoption Foundation 
519 
Infant adoptions in the United States are arranged primarily by private 
agencies and independent facilitators. The infant adoption market is 
characterized by high fees, demand for children that outstrips available supply, 
and marketing aimed both at prospective adopters and pregnant women who 
might consider placing their infants for adoption. Families that adopt infants 
tend to have higher incomes than those that adopt older children and children 
with special needs, and the families that adopt infants generally benefit more 
from available tax benefits. The market features and the role of money in 
infant adoption raise ethical questions related to the decisionmaking of 
mothers. 
Some adoption professionals and observers argue that adoptions should 
be arranged, as they are in some other countries, only by public child welfare 
agencies or highly regulated non-profit agencies.67 In the U.S., however, only 
three states limit the placement of children with unrelated adoptive parents to 
licensed agencies,68 and even in those states parties can arrange what are in 
effect independent adoptions by identifying one another and then using an 
agency to handle the arrangements.69 Adoption services providers in the U.S. 
66. ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: How THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION Is 
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 193 (2000). 
67. According to the CWLA, for example: 
Adoption as a child welfare service for children is best provided through an authorized 
public child welfare agency or voluntary, nonprofit adoption agency for those children 
who will not be raised by their birth parents and who can benefit from permanent family 
ties established through legal adoption. Adoption services are provided by social workers 
and other professionals, and encompass counseling for birth parents; assessment and 
preparation of prospective adoptive parents; assessment, preparation, and placement of 
children in adoptive families; and support for adoptive families, birth families, and adopted 
individuals following adoption. 
CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 9. The CWLA also advises that "[a]1I adoptions should 
be completed through licensed child-placing agencies. Independent (nonagency) adoptions, 
with the exception of adoptions by relatives and stepparents, should be eliminated .... " [d. at 
130. 
68. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(3)(West Supp. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.l3, 
§ 904 (Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22 (West 2003) (providing that a court may 
waive the limitation if it is in the best interest of the child). In Massachusetts, a licensed private 
or public agency must place the child or must give its written consent to the petition by the 
adopters. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 2A (West 1998). In Michigan, direct placements 
with Michigan residents are permitted with the assistance of an adoption attorney or agency. 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 71O.23a(3), 71 0.23d(b) (West 2002). 
69. Lawyer Mark T. McDermott, former president of the American Academy of Adoption 
Attorneys, notes that even in states that prohibit non-agency adoptions, "parties are able to 
achieve what is, in spirit, an independent adoption: the adoptive parents and birthparents 
identify each other without intervention by an agency and then arrange for the parental rights 
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include public agencies, nonprofit and for-profit private agencies, lawyers, 
physicians, and other "facilitators"-"a new breed of adoption entrepreneurs 
who specialize in finding pregnant women for prospective parents.,,70 With 
the Internet as "the main catalyst," there has been a "huge increase" in the 
number of adoptions in which generally white couples and birth parents 
identify one another.71 Public agencies principally arrange adoptions of older 
children and children with special needs,72 while most adoptions of domestic 
newborns are handled by private agencies and by independent,73 non-agency 
intermediaries. As the Packard Foundation's Center for the Future of Children 
explains, "public agencies have been required to focus on abused or neglected 
children waiting in foster care, while private agencies and intermediaries have 
tended to focus on finding voluntarily relinquished healthy babies for childless 
adults.,,74 Since 1970, according to historian Barbara Melosh, even private 
agency adoptions have "declined sharply, in what amounts to a massive de 
facto deregulation of child placement.,,75 Reliable statistics are not available 
on the relative number of private agency versus independent, non-agency 
to be relinquished through an agency so that the adoption becomes a 'directed agency 
adoption.'" Mark T. McDennott, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for 
Independent Adoption, 3 FUTURE OF CHILD.: ADOPTION 146, 146 (1993). 
70. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 36. 
71. Id. at 37. 
72. In 1998, in the public child welfare system, the median age of children whose 
adoptions were finalized was 4.8 years and only 6.2% were younger than one year old. See 
Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, 3 FUTURE OF CHILD.: ADOPTION 
26,35 (1993). As of Sept. 30, 2001, of the children in foster care waiting to be adopted, 96% 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REpORT, 
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report8.htm (last modified Mar. 28, 
2003). 
73. Definitions of the tenn "independent adoption" vary. For purposes of this Article, 
the term refers to adoptions that do not involve either a public or a licensed private agency. 
H. Joseph Gitlin defines an "independent adoption" as "a nonagency adoption of an unrelated 
child where the lawyer acts as a facilitator, or intennediary, between the parent(s) and adopting 
parent(s) and the actual placement (choice of adopting parents) is made by the birth parent(s)." 
H. JOSEPH GITLIN, ADOPTIONS: AN A TfORNEY'S GUIDE TO HELPING ADOPTIVE PARENTS 43 
(1987). The CWLA uses the tenns "independent adoption" and "private adoption" 
interchangeably, defining them as "adoption that takes place without the involvement oflegally 
regulated agencies, often involving physicians, lawyers, or others who, for a fee, identify and/or 
place a child with adoptive parents." CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 143. For an 
excellent review of agency-facilitated and of independent or "private-placement" adoption, see 
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1443,1444,1478-86. 
74. Ctr. for the Future of Children, Overview and Majur Recommendations, 3 FUTURE OF 
CHILD.: ADOPTION 4,5 (1993); see also 2 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 77-79 (discussing the 
demographics of children who are available for adoption). 
75. BARBARA MELOSH, STRANGERS AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 288 
(2002). 
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adoptions,76 but both these types of providers are subject to limited regulation 
and operate under a largely "laissez faire" regime.77 As adoption law scholar 
William M. Schur concludes with respect to agency adoptions, the "standards 
which agencies must meet for licensing purposes are generally minimum 
standards.,,78 As Melosh summarizes the situation, "after 1970, most 
placements have been made as private agreements executed between 
consenting adults, with minimal involvement from the state.,m 
Indisputably, "many more families are seeking healthy infants than there 
are healthy infants available for adoption.,,80 The number of adoptions has 
dropped in the United States from approximately 175,000 in 1970 to 118,779 
in 1990.81 About half of adoptions are by relatives, most commonly 
stepparents, and the overall proportion of adoptions of infants and very young 
children has declined.82 For every domestically born white baby, there are 
approximately six would-be parents.83 According to Adam Pertman, author 
of the leading popular account of adoption in America today, "far more [than 
six] want infants but don't try to adopt because they perceive the process as 
too daunting and the costs as too high.,,84 Greater infertility rates, delayed 
childbearing, wider tolerance of unmarried pregnancy, and increased 
acceptance of unmarried parenting all contribute to the disparity between 
supply and demand.8s Delayed childbearing and rising infertility have led to 
"a large number of infertile individuals" who "typically look to adopt 
newborns in this country or very young, healthy children from other 
countries.,,86 
The imbalance of demand and supply, and perhaps the intensely personal 
nature of the demand, probably account for some part of the increase in the 
cost of adoption87 as well as the periodic reported instances of adoption frauds 
76. Estimates of the percentages of adoptions arranged by private agencies versus 
independent providers vary. See generally McDermott, supra note 69, at 146 (stating that 
"more newborns are placed each year through independent adoption than through private 
agency adoption"); Stolley, supra note 72, at 31 (estimating that similar percentages of 
adoptions are arranged by private agencies and independent providers). 
77. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 37. 
78. William M. Schur, Attorney's Role in Private Agency Adoption, in 2 ADOPTION LAW 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, § 7.01(2). But see Singer, supra note 73, at 1481, 1485 
(indicating that while private adoptions "minimize state intervention," adoption agencies are 
"heavily regulated"). 
79. MEWSH, supra note 75, at 288. 
80. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 4. 
81. See JOHN TR!SEUOTIS ET AL., ADoPTION: THEORY, POUCY AND PRACTICE 15 (1997). 
82. Id. 
83. See 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
84. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 34. 
85. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 3. 
86. Id. at 4. 
87. Judge Richard L. Posner has made the controversial claim that legalizing regulated 
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and scandals.88 A publication of the Child Welfare League of America 
(CWLA) notes that "concerns increasingly are expressed that 
adoption-particularly infant adoption in the United States and international 
adoption-has been transformed into a service which has, as its core purpose, 
the finding of healthy babies for adults who wish-and can pay large fees-to 
adopt. ,,89 As adoption policy expert Madelyn Freundlich explains, "[a ]lthough 
'donative' intent may stand as the theoretical basis for infant adoption and may 
have greater appeal than a pure market analysis, it presents difficulties in 
actual application given the escalating sums of money involved in the adoption 
of very young children.,,9o 
In contrast to the cost of public agency adoptions, which range from zero 
to $2,500, the cost of a domestic private agency adoption ranges from $4,000 
to more than $30,000, and the cost of a domestic independent adoption ranges 
from $8,000 to more than $30,000, or reportedly to as much as $50,000.91 
Adoption cancellation insurance is available to protect families against 
expenditures that do not lead to a successful adoption.92 Marketing to 
prospective adoptive parents is prevalent by adoption facilitators and agencies, 
as is advertising by both agencies and prospective adoptive parents seeking 
babies. The author of Fast Track Adoption, a book for prospective adoptive 
parents, counsels that "the most effective way to connect with prospective 
birth mothers is to use direct advertising .... Couples who launch an effective 
"baby selling" might increase supply and reduce costs. See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation 
of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 59,64-65,68-70 (1987). Contra Jane Maslow 
Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REv. 105, 105-08 (1987). 
88. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption: The 
Significance of the Indian Adoption Scandals, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 403 (2005); Hugh 
Dellios & Bonnie Miller Rubin, Guatemala Delays Foreign Adoptions; Abductions Spark Push 
for Reform, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14,2003, at C19; Noelle Knox, Romania to Make Its Ban on 
International Adoptions Permanent, USA TODAY, June 16,2004, at 9D ("[Romania] agreed 
that the only way to end rampant corruption in the system was to end international adoption. "); 
Maureen O'Hagan, Guilty Plea in Federal Adoption Fraud Case; Seattle Agency Woman Was 
Praised as a Humanitarian, SEA TILE TIMES, June 24, 2004, at B I (reporting that a woman pled 
guilty to "visa fraud, money laundering and currency structuring, admitting that some 
Cambodian children she had adopted out as orphans did, in fact, have parents"); Walter F. 
Roche Jr., u.s. Enforcement Needed, Marshallese Official Says; Illegal Adoptions Likely to 
Continue Despite New Law, Authority Warns, BALT. SUN, May 7,2004, at 3A. 
89. 3 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at xiv (2001). 
90. 2 id. at 16-17. 
91. See NAT'L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., COSTS OF ADOPTING 1-3 (June 2004), available at http://naic.acfhhs.gov/pubs/s_ 
costls_costs.pdf [hereinafter COSTS OF ADOPTING]; Zeidler, supra note 65; see, e.g., 
2 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 12, 14; PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 228; Gay Jervey, Priceless, 
MONEY, Apr. 2003, at 119-24. For analyses of specific adoption costs, see 2 FREUNDLICH, 
supra note 3, at 19 and COSTS OF ADOPTING, supra, at 2-4. 
92. Art Adams, Adoption Cancellation Insurance, in ADOPTION F ACTBOOK III 477-79 
(Connaught Marshner ed., 1999); 2 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 20. 
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advertising campaign can often reduce their wait by months or even years.,,93 
Children in foster care who are available for adoption are advertised as well, 
and individual children have even been featured on the Internet by their 
parents or their parents' representatives.94 To find potentially available 
infants, adoption agencies use "billboards, newspaper ads, radio and TV 
commercials, and even tray liners at fast-food outlets."9S Individuals and firms 
help prospective adoptive parents market themselves to potential birth mothers 
with advertisements, biographies, photographs, scrapbooks, videotapes, and 
so forth.96 Social worker and author James L. Gritter reports that 
"[ i]mpoverished pregnant women are unapologetically considered 'targets' for 
creative marketing schemes.,,97 He "will never forget," he writes, "a comment 
by a social worker from Nebraska .... 'People from the West Coast do a lot 
of advertising in Nebraska,' she explained, 'because they view our expectant 
mothers as com-fed, disease-free stock. ",98 
F amities adopting independently appear to have higher incomes than those 
adopting through public agencies.99 According to Melosh, "[i]t seems evident 
... that the market model of adoption has increased the economic disparities 
between adoptive families and others."IOO Federal tax benefits for adopters 
generally provide greater benefits to families involved in the more expensive 
healthy newborn and international 101 adoptions, although the benefits are 
promoted as a means to increase adoptions of children out of foster care. I02 
93. SUSAN BURNS, FAST TRACK ADoPTION 21 (2003). She notes: 
Although there is always the potential to spend an unlimited amount of money on adoption 
advertising, those who spend excessively usually do so because they lack an effective 
strategy. . .. [W]hen advertising is properly planned, it is possible to limit the total costs 
to $3,000. In many cases advertising can be done for substantially less. 
Id. at 25. 
94. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 105-20. 
95. RICKIE SOUNGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS 125 (2001) (quoting Sheila Rule, 
Couples Taking Unusual Paths/or Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1984, at 1). 
96. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 106-07. 
97. JAMES L. GRITTER, LIFEGNERS: FRAMING THE BIRTHPARENT EXPERIENCE IN OPEN 
ADOPTION 56 (2004). 
98. Id. 
99. See COSTS OF ADOPTING, supra note 91, at 1, 3; MELOSH, supra note 75, at 289. 
100. MELOSH, supra note 75, at 289. 
101. Fees for intercountry adoptions are estimated to range from $7,000 to $25,000, but 
these adoptions may include additional expenses such as parents' travel and in-country stays, 
escorting fees, and foster care. COSTS OF ADoPTING, supra note 91, at 4. 
102. F or example, in 1996 when House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt endorsed the tax 
credit, he stated, "With 400,000 kids still in foster care in this country, now is the time to 
provide incentives for families wishing to adopt. . " We simply have to make adoption more 
affordable." Associated Press, Clinton Backing Republican Proposal for Tax Credit to Families 
That Adopt, DAILY RECORD, May 7, 1996, at 10. Similarly, a Missouri state tax credit aimed 
at encouraging the adoption of children out of foster care instead supported international 
adoptions: 
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The tax benefits even may have contributed to increasing adoption costs. In 
2003, the maximum benefits increased to $10,160 for the tax credit and for the 
amount excludable from income for qualifying expenses under an employer's 
adoption assistance program, both of which can be claimed in full if the 
adopters' modified adjusted gross income is $152,390 or less. 103 Freundlich 
suggests that the tax benefits may have "simply served to increase the cost of 
an adoption by an equivalent amount. . .. The rising cost of adoption may be 
associated, at least to some degree, with the availability of such subsidies. ,,104 
According to Pertman, who is now executive director of the Evan B. 
Donaldson Adoption Institute, lOS "[ s ]ince Congress enacted a $5,000 tax credit 
for adoptions in 1997, a growing number of practitioners have been raising 
their charges about $5,000.,,106 Freundlich points out that "[t]he structure of 
the tax credit does not benefit families who adopt children in foster 
care-typically families of moderate means who incur few up front costs in 
adopting but who may be in greater need of ongoing financial supports to meet 
the special needs of the children they adopt. ,,107 Yet, she reports, efforts to 
increase the tax credit have met with less legislative concern about fiscal 
impact than efforts to increase the availability of adoption subsidies for 
adopting children with special needs. 108 
The role of money in adoption raises ethical questions with respect to the 
impact on mothers' decisionmaking processes. As Freundlich frames two of 
these questions, 
To what extent do prospective adoptive parents' expenditures to cover a birth 
A $2 million Missouri tax credit that many hoped would have encouraged families to 
adopt the state's foster children is instead being used almost exclusively to help underwrite 
the cost of adopting children from other countries. 
According to a report released Monday by state Auditor Claire McCaskill, 90 percent 
of the tax credits in 2002 went to parents who adopted children internationally. 
And while McCaskill said she supported those kinds of adoptions, she questions whether 
the tax incentive program was accomplishing its aim. 
Matthew Franck, Missouri Auditor Questions Adoption Tax Credit, ST. LOUIS POST -DISPATCH, 
Feb. 17,2004, at BI. 
103. Both the credit and the exclusion can be claimed if they are claimed for different 
expenses. Smaller credits and exclusions may be claimed up to an income of $192,390, at 
which level the benefits are no longer available. lNTERNALREVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE 
TREASURY, PUB. No. 968, TAX BENEFITS FOR AooPTION 1-3 (2004), available at http://www.irs. 
gov/pubJications/p968/arO I.html. 
104. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 21. 
105. Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, Who We Are. Staff, at http://www.adoption 
institute.org/whowe/whosta.html (last visited May 15,2005) (a non-profit institute devoted to 
adoption policy research and analysis). 
106. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 189. 
107. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 21; see also PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 199-200 
(discussing how adoption is increasingly becoming an activity for the affluent). 
108. 2 FREUNDUCH, supra note 3, at 95. 
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mother's medical costs or other living expenses create a sense of 
indebtedness that may affect her decision-making? . .. Does a birth mother 
ultimately "owe" it to the prospective adoptive parents to follow-through on 
the adoption because a good deal of money has been expended on her 
behalf? 109 
525 
Pertman reports that there are Internet sites on which prospective parents who 
sign up with an adoption attorney or agency can receive passwords for chat 
rooms and "receive instructions about how to use financial incentives to 
persuade ambivalent pregnant women to relinquish their children."llo An 
adoptive father explains, '" We were led to understand, in so many words, that 
the more we gave her, the more obligated she'd feel to give up her child, 
which she ultimately did .... ",III A woman who stayed in a Texas-based 
agency's home for pregnant women while deciding whether to place her child 
reported that "'they got you to the point of feeling like you were supposed to 
give up your baby as the price of admission for all the generous benefits they 
gave you. ",112 
Another ethical question related to the decisionmaking process of mothers 
is whether in the "adoption market," adoption services inevitably will focus on 
satisfying the desires of the "paying customers," the prospective adoptive 
parent "who is likely to be the primary, ifnot exclusive, 'client' because he or 
she pays the fee for the services.,,113 The claim is made that prospective birth 
mothers are increasingly powerful because they are gaining the opportunity to 
select adoptive parents, but as Freundlich concludes, the mothers "generally 
do not feel empowered in the adoption process," and the "adoptive parents, 
because they usually bring greater social and financial advantages compared 
to those of most birth parents, hold greater power with adoption service 
providers.,,114 Adoptive parents not only pay high fees for adoption, they are 
also the objects ofincreasing competition in an adoption marketplace in which 
the number of service providers has grown rapidlyllS and in which those 
service providers may be able to remain in the market "only if healthy infants 
can be speedily provided.,,116 
109. 2 id. at 23-24. 
110. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 187. 
111. Id. at 188. 
112. Jd. at 197. 
113. 2 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 26. 
114. 2 id. at 27. 
115. See 2 id. at 33. 
116. 2 id. at 32. 
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IV. BEST PRACTICES 
Adoption ought never be organized as a proprietary tussle between 
birth parents and adoptive parents. Rather, it is better understood as an 
exercise in cooperation. 117 
James L. Gritter, Adoption Social Worker 
This Part examines the practices that characterize ethical and humane 
infant adoption services, the kind of services that prevent unnecessary family 
separation and promote finality. These practices fall within the areas of 
adoption counseling, the structure of adoption services, the legal 
representation of the parties to adoption, and the timing of adoption consents. 
A. Counseling 
Adoption professionals and most organizations involved in adoption agree 
that counseling services should be available for women considering placing 
their babies for adoption.IIB Laws in eighteen states require that some 
counseling be offered, generally by an adoption agency, while another ten 
states require some quantum of counseling services. "9 Skilled counseling, the 
CWLA advises, helps provide assurance that "[i]nformed decisions will be 
made by both the birth and adoptive parents.,,120 Counseling for parents, as 
explained in a comprehensive guide to adoption practices, can help parents to 
"own" their decisions, I2I that is, can help them feel "in control through having 
a real choice.,,'22 Having felt as if she had a real choice is a factor associated 
with "positive resolutions" for birth mothers, as is having an opportunity to 
talk, to reflect, and "to anticipate future pain.,,123 Counseling for mothers 
should include providing information about alternatives to adoption, options 
within adoption, legal steps and consequences involved in adoption, and 
possible effects of adoption on themselves and their children. Ideally, 
117. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 23. 
118. Of course, not every woman will wish to receive counseling. A recent book on 
adoption policy and practice discusses this point: 
It would be presumptuous to think that social workers can help every parent to reach an 
appropriate decision concerning their child. In the first place, some parents will not need 
a social worker to help them make up their minds. They will do so, one way or another, 
and stick to it. Others may explore offers of counseling and other services but feel they 
are perfectly able to cope alone. 
TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 97. 
119. See infra Part V. 
120. See CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 131. 
121. TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 113. 
122. Id. at 100. 
123. Id. 
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counseling will also help mothers resolve issues that arise with the fathers and 
family members. 
Information should be provided to mothers both orally and in writing. As 
social worker Patricia Roles puts it in her guide for counselors, published by 
the CWLA, "[0 ]nly with all the facts can anyone make a well-thought-out, 
informed decision. Supplying written information is most useful because it 
allows the client to read and digest the material when she feels ready.,,124 
Information provided orally may be insufficient because the recipient may be 
"in a state of shock or denial and unable to retain all the information.,,125 
Initially, information should be available to pregnant women and new 
mothers about what alternatives are available for the care of their children, 
how to determine the support needed to rear their children, and how to access 
the resources they will need. 126 The CWLA advises agencies to "support birth 
parents and extended family members, whenever possible, in providing for 
their children's safety and protection.,,127 A similar view is expressed by 
adoption counselor and author James L. Gritter, who advises that if possible, 
"[t]he obvious first effort is to find ways to relieve these circumstances,,128 that 
have led the mother to consider adoption. 
Secondly, information should be provided about adoption, which as Gritter 
points out, "at its best is often a bittersweet mixture of triumph and 
sadness. . .. Women who are thinking about adoption should not base their 
ideas on propaganda; they deserve a reasonable description of its costs and 
benefits.,,129 Ifmothers choose adoption, they should have information about 
and understand options within adoption and the consequences of different 
options, incl,uding possible degrees of openness. 130 Openness before birth may 
mean that the pregnant woman and adoptive parents meet, spend time together, 
and in some1cases, all be present at the birth. Openness after the adoption may 
range from the adoptive parents occasionally providing photographs of and 
reports about the child to a schedule of regular visits. 131 There is especially 
intense debate over the advisability of having prospective adoptive parents 
present at birth. The support and advocacy group Concerned United 
Birthparents (CUB)132 advises women against having the prospective adoptive 
124. 2APATRICIARoLEs, SAYING GoODBYE TO A BABY 15 (1989). 
125. 2A id. 
126. See CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 28. 
127. Id. at 13. 
128. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 213. 
129. Id. at 88. 
130. See id. 
13l. The CWLA describes open adoption as an "arrangement that recognizes the child's 
connection to both the birth family and the adoptive family by supporting interaction among 
the birth parents, adoptive parents, and the child through telephone calls, correspondence, or 
personal contact, depending upon the particular situation." CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, 
at 142. 
132. CUB describes itself as a group that includes 
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parents in the delivery room because "they make it next to impossible to 
change your mind."133 Even those more amenable to the idea counsel caution 
because it "may make birthmothers feel obligated to relinquish the child even 
if they want to change their mind. They may not want to let the couple down. 
It is important therefore to be clear with all parties involved that the decision 
may be changed after the birth.,,134 
In addition to information about options within adoption, mothers should 
receive accurate and clear information about legal steps and consequences 
involved, and they should receive copies of all papers they sign. 135 For 
example, they should be informed about whether they may give binding 
consent before the birth, after the birth, or only after the passage of a certain 
number of hours or days after the birth. They should be informed about 
whether they have any right to revoke their consent and, if so, when and how 
to do so and whether revocation means automatic return of the child or a 
judicial best-interests determination. If any agreements are contemplated 
between the mother and 'the prospective adoptive parents, such as agreements 
concerning providing information about the child's development, they should 
be informed about whether and under what circumstances the agreements are 
enforceable. 
Mothers should also have information about the ways that placing a child 
for adoption may affect them in the short and long term. The CWLA 
standards advise that "[i]n all instances, birth parents and other family 
members should receive counseling to help them understand the grief and 
loss" that they may experience.136 While studies are limited, those that have 
been conducted "suggest that relinquishment is a very stressful event and that 
many mothers are haunted by it for years later.,,137 The studies constitute "a 
growing body of recent research data which has supported the claims of birth 
parents that relinquishing a child is indeed a profound loss experience, and that 
birthparents, adoptees, adoptive parents, other adoption affected people and professionals. 
CUB's purposes are providing mutual support for coping with the ongoing challenges of 
adoption, working for adoption reform in law and social policy, preventing unnecessary 
family separations, assisting adoption separated relatives in searching for family members, 
and educating the public about adoption issues and realities. 
Concerned United Birthparents, What is CUB?, at http://www.cubirthparents.orglpage9.htm 
(last visited May 10, 2005). 
133. HEATHER LOWE, WHAT You SHOUWKNow IF YOU'RE CONSIDERING ADOPTION FOR 
YOUR BABY § 10, available at http://www.cubirthparents.orglbooklet.pdf(lastvisitedMay 10, 
2005). 
134. 2AROLES, supra note 124, at 18. 
135. See GRITTER, supra note 97, at 217; 2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 18. 
136. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 28. 
137. TRiSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81 at 99; see also Diana S. Edwards, American 
Adoption and the Experiences a/Relinquishing Mothers, PRACTICING ANTHROPOLOGY, Winter 
1999, at 18 (discussing her research documenting birth mothers' experiences). 
2005] CONSENTS TO ADOPTION 529 
this loss even can have long-term deleterious results.,,138 Researchers have 
found among "birth mothers unresolved anger, pathological mourning, guilt, 
searching in waking life or in dreams and memories, [and] being stirred by 
anniversaries such as the child's birthday. Continuing distress, cycles of 
blame, guilt and personal anguish arising from the parting decision are some 
ofthe lingering feelings.,,139 Similarly, long-term effects have been reported 
both by counselors who have interviewed and worked with birth mothers and 
by birth mothers who have written about their experiences. For example, 
adoption counselor and author James L. Gritter reports that "few ... 
birthparents are prepared for the grief they encounter. Most find it far more 
forceful and complex than they anticipated. They are amazed at the intensity 
of its grip and dismayed at its staying power.,,140 In a similar vein, CUB 
advises mothers, "Placing your child for adoption profoundly and irreversibly 
changes your life. . .. After the first years, the grief is not static; while never 
fully disappearing, it does ebb and flOW.,,141 
Offering a more positive view of the effects on birth mothers, some U.S. 
research, which is primarily focused on teen women, "has suggested 
educational and economic benefits for single women when they choose 
adoption instead of parenting and important benefits for their children when 
they are placed with adoptive families.,,142 In addition, the possible negative 
138. ROBIN C. WINKLER ET AL., CLINICAL PRACTICE IN ADOPTION 48 (1988) (citing K.D. 
INGLIS, LIVING MISTAKES: MOTHERS WHO CONSENTED TO ADOPTION (1984); R. WINKLER & 
M. VAN KEpPEL, RELINQUISHING MOTHERS IN ADOPTION: THEIR LONG-TERM ADJUSTMENT 
(1984); John T. Condon, Psychological Disability in Women Who Relinquish a Baby for 
Adoption, 144 MED. J. AUSTL. 177 (1986); Eva Y. Deykin et aI., The Post-Adoption Experience 
of Surrendering Parents, AM. J. ORTHOPSYClllATRY, Apr. 1984, at 271-280; E. Reynearson, 
Relinquishment and Its Maternal Complications: A Preliminary Study, 139 AM. J. PSYClllATRY 
338 (1982); A. Fonda, Birth Mothers Who Search: An Exploratory Study (1984)(unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology, Berkeley, CaL); J. 
McHutchison, Relinquishing a Child: The Circumstances and Effect of Loss (1986) 
(unpublished BSS thesis, University of New South Wales, Australia)); see also id. at 53 
(discussing the immediate post-relinquishment period). 
139. TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 45 (citing P. BOUCHIER ET AL., PARTING WITH 
A CHILD FOR ADOPTION (1991); D. HOWE ET AL., HALF A MILLION WOMEN (1992); WINKLER 
& VAN KEpPEL, supra note 138; R. Pannor et aI., Open Adoption as Standard Practice, 63 
CHILD WELFARE 245 (1984); s. Wells, What Do Birth Mothers Want?, 17 ADOPTION & 
FOSTERING 22, 22-32 (1993)). 
140. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 109; see, e.g. , JAYNE E. SCHOOLER & BETSIE L. NORRIS, 
JOURNEYS AFTER ADOPTION: UNDERSTANDING LIFELONG ISSUES 84 (2002) ("She may not feel 
her grief initially, but will find it surfacing later in her life at major milestones. 'The grieving 
never stopped. It only went below my threshold of awareness for periods of time,' said Carol 
Schaefer, a birthmother and author .... "). 
141. LOWE, supra note 133, § 12. 
142. 3 FREUNDLICH, supra note 3, at 86 (citing F. FURSTENBERG, JR. ET AL., ADOLESCENT 
MOTHERS IN LATER LIFE (1987); Greg 1. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Teenage Welfare Receipt 
and Subsequent Dependence Among BlackAdolescent Mothers, 22 F AM. PLANNING PERSP. 16 
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effects on birth mothers may be lessened when they have had sufficient 
resources and support to make an informed and deliberate choice, as discussed 
throughout this Part about best practices. Based on many years of work in 
adoption, Gritter observes that "the degree of control birthparents have over 
the situation powerfully affects their long-term satisfaction with the 
arrangement.,,143 Practitioner and researcher John Triseliotis adds, "It is now 
recognized that many of the issues raised by birth mothers with researchers 
might have been resolved if they had had the support of trained and 
experienced professionals who were not directly involved with the adoption 
decision."I44 Social worker Patricia Roles agrees that when "a birthparent can 
take responsibility for her decision and feel that she has a choice," she can 
"incorporate the experience into her adult life without being hindered by 
regret, blame or anger.,,145 
Mothers also should have information concerning the effects of adoption 
on children. As Gritter writes, "advantages [of adoption for the child] are 
accompanied by significant losses. . .. A pregnant woman considering 
adoption for her child needs to consider the ratio of losses and gains posed by 
the adoption choice.,,146 For the adopted person as well as for the birth and 
adoptive parents, adoption is now thought to be "a lifelong process.,,147 
Psychologist and researcher David M. Brodzinsky concludes that while "most 
adopted children appear to cope quite well with the challenges, conflicts, and 
demands of adoptive family life," a review of the limited research available 
suggests that "adopted children are at an increased risk for psychological and 
academic problems in comparison to their non-adopted counterparts.,,148 
Adopted children are thought to face some unique developmental challenges. 
(1990); Frank L. Mott & William Marsiglio, Early Childbearing and Completion of High 
School, 17 F AM. PLANNING PERSP. 234 (1985». Freundlich also describes research that "finds 
mixed outcomes [after four years] for unmarried teen women who choose parenting or 
adoption." 3 id. at 87 (citing S. McLaughlin et aI., Do Adolescents Who Relinquish Their 
Children Fare Better or Worse Than Those Who Raise Them?, 20 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 25 
(1988); P.B. Namerow et aI., The Determinants of Young Women's Pregnancy-Resolution 
Choices,3 J. REs. ON ADOLESCENCE 193 (1993». 
143. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 89; see also id. at 196 (discussing the birth mother's 
perspective of owning her decision). 
144. TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 99; see also WINKLER ET AL., supra note 138, 
at 50-51 ("Damaged self-esteem and a strong sense of worthlessness (complicated by shame 
and guilt) resulted from the way in which their needs and experiences were ignored by members 
of the adoption community."). 
145. 2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 19. 
146. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 87. 
147. WINKLER ET AL., supra note 138, at ix; see also Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or 
the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1148-54 (2003) (discussing "adoptive families and 
assimilation"). 
148. David M. Brodzinsky, A Stress and Coping Model of Adoption Adjustment, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 3,23 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990). 
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"[U]nlike children growing up with their birth parents," Triseliotis observes, 
"those adopted have to accomplish or be aided to accomplish a number of 
additional psychological tasks, which most of them do successfully.,,149 Those 
tasks include attaching to new parents, understanding the meaning of adoption, 
acknowledging the differences involved in having two sets of parents, and 
"dealing with the sense of loss of the original parents and the element of 
rejection that it conveys.,,150 Adoptees in traditional closed adoptions wonder 
about their birth parents and why they were placed for adoption. 151 According 
to psychologist Robin C. Winkler, their "fantasies vary on a continuum; they 
may be occasional and have little significance for behavior, or they may be 
constant preoccupations and be of great significance to many areas of 
functioning.,,152 It is widely believed, Triseliotis writes, that adoptees can best 
resolve their identity issues by acknowledging rather than denying their 
"biological roots and heritage, including race and ethnicity.,,153 
Counseling services for mothers, whenever possible, should include 
communication and consultation with the fathers and with family members. 
When there is disagreement among family members, the CWLA recommends 
that "skillful counseling should be provided to help all parties reach agreement 
whenever possible.,,154 Studies of unmarried pregnant women's 
decisionmaking have reported that the women's parents are important 
influences. 155 In Triseliotis' s view of desirable practices, "[ s ]ocial workers can 
use mediation and other skills to help defuse conflict and promote a better 
family relationship and/or create a generally more supportive environment for 
149. TRiSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 35. Another book for practitioners explains, 
"While all children follow the same path of development, adopted children are exposed to a 
unique set of tasks which tend to complicate their development." WINKLER ET AL., supra note 
138, at 85. 
150. TRiSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 35. 
151. WINKLERET AL., supra note 138, at II. 
152. Id. For literature on adoptees' development and adjustment, see, for example, 
ALEXINA McWINNIE, ADOPTED CHIWREN AND How THEy GROW UP (1967); RONALD J. 
NYDAM, ADoPTEES COME OF AGE (1999); and EUNOR B. ROSENBERG, THE ADOPTION LIFE 
CYCLE: THE CHILDREN AND THEIR F AMIUES THROUGH THE YEARS (1992). 
153. TRiSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 14; see also H. DAVID KIRK., SHARED FATE: A 
THEORY OF ADOPTION AND MENTAL HEALTH (1964) (analyzing a range of acceptance issues 
in the adoptive relationship). 
154. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 29. 
155. Freundlich reports on research in the 1980s and early 1990s involving pregnant teen 
women and showing that their mothers most influenced the decision. 3 FREUNDUCH, supra 
note 3, at 78. She describes research published in 1996 involving pregnant women ages 
fourteen through thirty-six that also identified the involvement oftheir parents as a "key factor," 
but unlike the earlier studies, in the direction of choosing parenting rather than adoption. 3 id. 
at 80. 
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the mother and the expected baby, without taking the decision away from the 
birth parent.,,156 
In addition to providing mothers with the kinds of information discussed 
above, counselors should understand "the ambivalence and denial that birth 
parents often experience.,,157 Pertman suggests that 
[0 ]ne of the most productive functions adoption professionals can serve is to 
catch the warning signs of a change of mind as early as possible. Doing so 
benefits everyone concerned-the pregnant women who endure less angst by 
making their determinations sooner rather than later, and the adoptive parents 
who are spared the heartbreak of anticipating children who will never 
arrive. ISS 
For mothers, Gritter observes, "Seldom is adoption selected as a true 
preference-it almost always involves a pronounced element of necessity. 
The idea of adoption ... only emerges as a possible outcome when something 
is seriously askew.,,159 Statistics support the observation that adoption is not 
a "preferred" option for unmarried pregnant women. Between 1989 and 1995, 
the percentage of unmarried white women placing children for adoption was 
approximately 1.7%, and the percentage for African-American women was 
even smaller. 160 Among women today who believe they have settled on 
adoption before the birth, it is estimated that "at least half ultimately discover 
that they can't go through with it once they actually see their babies as living, 
breathing realities.,,161 
B. Structure of Adoption Services 
Even when counseling is available and includes the fathers and family 
members, there is an inherent troubling potential for imposition of biases and 
conflicts of interest. According to the National Association of Social Workers 
Code of Ethics, the "best-known ethics code to which social workers in the 
United States'subscribe,,,162 social workers have a fundamental responsibility 
to facilitate their clients self-determination,163 expand choice and opportunity 
156. TRISEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 96. 
157. CWLASTANDARDS, supra note 9, at 28-29; see also GRITTER, supra note 97, at 91-
107 (discussing the ambivalence of birth parents). 
158. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 109. 
159. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 94. 
160. See Anjani Chandra et aI., Adoption, Adoption Seeking, and Relinquishment for 
Adoption in the United States, (Nat'l Center for Adoption Statistics, ADVANCE DATA Report 
No. 306, 1999). 
161. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 109. 
162. FREDERIC G. REAMER, SOCIAL WORK. V ALVES AND ETHICS 44 (1995). 
163. See NAT'LAss'N OF SOC. WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS § 1.02 (1999). 
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for all people,l64 and, when necessary, "tak~ reasonable steps to ensure" that 
their employers' practices are consistent with the code of ethics. 165 
Complicating the adoption counselor's task is the fact that in a crisis, the 
counselor has the potential to exercise "immense power.,,166 "There are times, 
especially when frustration runs high, when the decisionmaker would love to 
have some powerful, decisive person come along and take the decision out of 
her hands.,,167 
As Roles points out in her guide for counselors, if a "young woman must 
make her own decision because she has to live with it for the rest of her life," 
then the ideal counselor is "a neutral, unbiased [one] who has no vested 
interest in the outcomes of her decision."168 She continues, "If a client feels 
pressured toward any particular choices, a power struggle will result where the 
client will be forced to defend her position, rather than consider all the 
options.,,169 Gritter observes, "To the worker who is trying to arrange 
adoption, [the woman's] ambivalence is an exasperating, frustrating 
impediment to overcome. To the worker striving to help the expectant mother 
settle on the best decision, it is the central issue, a normal and expected aspect 
of the work to be done.,,17o 
Counselors, . agency officials, and intermediaries of course may have 
strong biases based on their philosophical, religious, or social views. They 
may favor family preservation, regardless of the circumstances, or they may 
believe adoption is invariably the best option when a mother is unmarried or 
has limited economic and social support. The views of the volunteers and 
professionals in the child welfare community have varied over time. In the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the expectation of child welfare 
workers was that unmarried pregnant women would keep their children. 
According to his.torian Barbara Melosh, child welfare workers in the 1920s 
and 1930s were reluctant advocates of adoption at a time when increasing 
numbers of couples sought to adopt, but workers later endorsed adoption as a 
solution for a child born out of wedlock. l7l After World War II, "adoption 
became social policy," and "[r]eversing their former reluctance to separate 
stngle mothers and their children, social workers came to consider adoption 
the best solution for unwed mothers and their children.,,172 Their "zeal for 
relinquishment was driven partly by the conviction that women pregnant out 
164. Id. § 6.04(b). 
165. Id. § 3.09(d). 
166. TRiSELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 97. 
167. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 103. 
168. 2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 14. 
169. 2A id. 
170. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 103-04. 
171. See MELOSH, supra note 75, at 17-20; see also Naomi Cahn, Birthing Relationships, 
17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 179-84 (2002) (discussing the change in attitude towards adoption 
that began in the 1920s). 
172. . MELOSH, supra note 75, at 105-06. 
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of wedlock were by definition unfit mothers" whose pregnancies were 
evidence of neuroses. 173 Although professional ethics, then as now, dictated 
that social workers support pregnant women in reaching their own decisions, 
social workers "believed strongly that adoption was the best decision for most, 
and this commitment inevitably colored their relationships with women 
considering relinquishment." 174 
Another factor that can affect the neutrality of counseling is the conflict 
that arises from providing services to birth parents and adoptive parents 
simultaneously. It is natural for service providers to attend to the clients who 
are paying for the services-the prospective adoptive parents, 175 and it is easier 
for many providers to sympathize with the adoptive parents, who are more 
established in life and have struggled to conceive a child. CUB advises 
pregnant women and new mothers not to expect that an agency or a pregnancy 
counselor "will have only your best interest in mind. They do not, and they 
cannot. Adoption agencies, like it or not, have to make money to operate. The 
paying client is the adoptive parent, so services are usually geared toward 
them.,,176 Gritter observes that professionals involved in adoption "[m]ost of 
the time . . . find it easier to identify with adoptive parents than with 
birthparents, who are typically less established.,,177 Roles's guide for 
counselors concludes that an "agency with a vested interest in a client's 
decision . . . opens itself to potential abuse and neglect of birthparents' 
rights.,,178 Triseliotis goes as far as to conclude that a social worker involved 
in arranging an adoption should not simultaneously work with a birth parent 
choosing between different altematives. 179 "In other words, the birth parents 
need to have their own separate social worker. This can help to preserve 
objectivity, impartiality and continued support where needed.,,180 
173. Id. at 11 O. 
174. Id. at 123. 
175. See supra Part III. 
176. LOWE, supra note 133, § 6. 
177. GRITTER, supra note 97, at 210. 
178. 2A ROLEs, supra note 124, at 13. 
179. TRISELIOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 95. 
180. Id. The availability of peer support is also recommended for birth parents considering 
placing their children for adoption. Triseliotis notes, for example, that "[iln some instances it 
will be helpful for the parent to meet others who have faced the same dilemma and to discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of the various outcomes." Id. at 97. Roles agrees that 
referring birth parents "to support networks or groups for birthparents can be helpful." 
2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 20; see also WINKLERET AL., supra note 138, at 51 (suggesting 
that birth parents meet with others who can "relate their personal experiences"); LoWE, supra 
note 133, § 7 (suggesting that birth mothers talk to women who have been through the 
relinquishment process). 
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C. Legal Representation 
It is in independent adoptions, the most common type of domestic infant 
adoption,181 that questions about legal representation most frequently arise. Is 
it permissible for one lawyer to represent both the adoptive and birth parents? 
Should the parties be required to have separate representation in all cases or 
only in cases in which birth parents are minors or under some other disability? 
In an informal opinion in 1987, the American Bar Association Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility concluded that a lawyer 
may not ethically represent both parties. 182 Dual representation is expressly 
permitted, however, in at least two states, Kansasl83 and Califomia.184 It is 
expressly prohibited by statutes in a number of states, including Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin,185 and 
Florida prohibits intermediaries from providing legal representation or advice 
to birth parents. 186 Louisiana requires separate representation in all private 
adoptions,187 and a small number of states, including Kansas, Maryland, 
Montana, and Vermont, require separate representation for minor parents. 188 
181. See supra Part III. 
182. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof! Responsibility, Informal Op. 1523 (1987) 
[hereinafter ABA Informal Op.). 
183. In re Adoption of Baby Girl T., 21 P.3d 581, 589 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that 
dual representation is permitted if certain conditions are met). 
184. CAL. FAM. CODE. § 8800(c)-(d) (West 2004). In California an attorney must have 
written consent of the parties before engaging in dual representation, but the attorney may not 
engage in dual representation "whenever a birth parent displays the slightest reason for the 
attorney to believe any controversy might arise." CAL. FAM. CODE. § 8800(c). Ifa conflict 
arises after an attorney begins dual representation, the attorney must withdraw. CAL. F AM. 
CODE. § 8800( c). In addition, birth parents have the right to an independent attorney to whom 
prospective adoptive parents may be required to pay reasonable attorney's fees up to $500 
unless a higher fee is agreed to by the parties. CAL. F AM. CODE. § 8800( d). 
185. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.492 (Michie 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-
106(a) (West 1964); MD. CODEANN.,FAM. LAW§ 5-323(e) (1999); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
§ 722.956(c)(ix) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.47 (West 2003); N.Y. SOC. SERV.LAW 
§ 374(6) (McKinney 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.837(8) (West 2003). 
186. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.032, 63.085 (West 1997). 
187. LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1121 (West 2004). 
188. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2115 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323(a)(l) 
(appointment of counsel also required for parent rendered by disability incapable of consenting 
and effectively participating in proceedings); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-405(2) (2003); YT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405(c) (2002). Alabama and Arkansas require appointment of a 
guardian ad litem for a minor birth parent. ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-8 (Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 9-9-220 (Michie 2002). Maine requires the court to appoint an attorney for an indigent 
birth parent who is a minor, unless the birth parent refuses or "the court determines that 
representation is unnecessary." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-106(b). New Hampshire 
requires representation if a birth parent is incompetent, mentally ill, or retarded. N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:5(II) (2002). 
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In practice, when separate representation is not required, birth parents 
generally are unrepresented. 189 There are potential risks for mothers without 
representation, but as the debates about representation reveal, there also are 
risks when they are represented by either the adoptive parents' lawyer or 
separate counsel paid for by the adoptive parents. 190 
Dual representation proponents argue that a conflict of interest between 
the parties is "often more hypothetical than real" because both parties "are 
usually strongly in favor of the adoption.,,191 Writing about how dual 
representation is permitted under some circumstances in California, lawyer Jed 
Somit also contends that separate representation increases costs and introduces 
the specter of runaway fees if the adoptive parents are liable for the birth 
parents' attorney's fees without limit. 192 Separate representation "makes or at 
least stigmatizes as adversarial what is ideally a cooperative process.,,193 He 
offers the disheartening additional argument that, despite its dangers, dual 
representation may be preferable to separate representation because the birth 
parents' attorney is usually paid less and may provide inferior 
representation. 194 In any event, it is claimed that "experienced adoption 
attorneys avoid dual representation" in the "[m]any situations" in which it is 
not suitable. 195 If dual representation has been undertaken and a conflict 
arises, the lawyer should withdraw and the parties can then obtain separate 
counsel,196 or, as expressly permitted in some state court decisions, the lawyer 
may terminate the dual representation and choose which party to continue 
representing. 197 
Opponents of dual representation, including the ABA, maintain there are 
"inherent conflicts" that "cannot be reconciled" between the biological 
parents' right to withhold or revoke consent and the prospective adoptive 
189. "In the vast majority of adoptions where the child is adopted on the basis of a consent 
to adoption, the petitioners are represented by a lawyer but the consenting parties are not." 
GITLIN, supra note 73, at 22. 
190. See, e.g., Pamela K. Strom AmIung, Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Independent 
Adoptions: Pitfallsfor the Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 169 (1990); Linda Jean Davie, Note, 
Babes and Barristers: Legal Ethics and Lawyer-Facilitated Independent Adoptions, 12 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 933 (1984). Adoptive parents may pay birth parents' legat fees except in a 
number of states in which the specified expenses that adoptive parents may pay do not include 
legal costs. Amlung, supra, at 184 & n.l09. 
191. Jed Somit, Independent Adoptions in California; Dual Representation Allowed, in 2 





196. See id. 
197. See, e.g., Arden v. State Bar of Cal., 341 P.2d 6, II (Cal. 1959); In re Adoption of 
Baby Girl H., 739 P.2d 1,3 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987). 
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parents' goal of securing consent and avoiding revocation. 198 In this view, 
dual representation violates Rule 1.7(a) of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which prohibits representing a client "if the 
representation of [that] client will be directly adverse to another client," unless 
the lawyer reasonably believes it will not be and each client consents after 
consultation.199 Conflicts may arise over not only the ultimate issue of consent 
but also issues of financial support, the timing of consents and placements,200 
and if contemplated by the parties, the nature and extent of future contact. The 
ability of parties to knowingly consent to dual representation is doubted, given 
the emotional and stressful nature of their situations: "It is difficult to believe 
[that they] can really grasp the essential point: that the same lawyer is 
advising the biological mother and the couple who desperately want to obtain 
her child.,,201 Also, consent cannot be obtained from two interested parties: 
that is, the child being adopted and the state.202 Finally, the Model Rules 
indicate that costs for services performed by two lawyers should not exceed 
the cost of the same services provided by one lawyer. "If the savings by 
retaining a single attorney is obtained at the sacrifice of adequate, thorough 
representation of each party's separate interest, it would seem a dubious 
benefit. ,,203 
Does any expression of doubt or ambivalence by a mother mean that the 
attorney must cease dual representation? Will a mother's interests be 
compromised if a conflict arises and dual representation ceases when a 
revocation period is about to expire? If there has been dual representation, 
will adoptive parents be vulnerable to a challenge to the adoption based on a 
claim of undue influence or duress? If a conflict arises, is it permissible for 
the attorney to continue to represent the adoptive parents who are paying for 
the legal services, even though the dual representation has "removed the 
communications of the parties to one another and to the attorney from the 
privileged category,,?204 If it is not permissible for the attorney to continue to 
represent one of the parties, will costs considerably increase in situations in 
which dual representation has been undertaken and terminated? 
Those who favor requiring separate representation, whether in all cases or 
in a limited class of cases, emphasize the important nature of the adoption 
proceeding, the typical imbalance of power between birth parents and adoptive 
parents, the possibility of conflicts of interest, and the fact that many birth 
198. ABA Informal Op., supra note 182. 
199. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002). 
200. See Katherine G. Thompson & Douglas H. Reiniger, Private-Placement Adoptions 
in New York; Separate Representation Required, in 2 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 6, § 6.01(3)(a). 
201. Id. § 6.01(3)(b). 
202. See id. 
203. Id. § 6.01(7). 
204. See Arden Y. State Bar of Cal., 341 P.2d 6, 11 (Cal. 1959). 
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mothers change their minds after the birth. Lawyers Katherine G. Thompson 
and Douglas H. Reiniger, for example, argue for separate representation 
because most mothers are young, lack financial resources,20S and are in such 
stressful, painful situations that their "capacity for rational decision-making at 
this time is not completely reliable.,,206 Prospective adoptive parents, in 
contrast, tend to be "somewhat older than most biological parents," are 
"usually well above-average in income and education,,,207 and are thus more 
financially able to retain an attorney.20S Even with separate representation, 
there is a danger of the mother's attorney being too closely associated with the 
prospective adoptive parents or their attorney if the mother's attorney has been 
recommended by the adoptive parents' attorney or is paid by the adoptive 
parents. The danger is described in a proposed model disclosure form: 
There is a risk that since the money is coming from [Adopting Parents] 
through [Adopting Parents' Attorney's] office, I will be more attentive to 
their needs, and more cooperative with that law office, than I am to your 
interests .... However, I am an experienced attorney, and I believe I can 
represent the interests of my clients notwithstanding getting paid (or not 
getting paid) by another.209 
Reflecting a similar concern is the advice that birth parents obtain an attorney 
through referrals independent of the adoptive parents' attorney. "[T]he 
attorney for the adoptive parents should have little or no control over what 
lawyer represents the birth parente s). . .. If the adoptive parents' attorney does 
205. See Thompson & Reiniger, supra note 200, § 6.01(2)(a)(iii). 
206. Id. § 6.01(2)(a)(ii). 
207. Id. § 6.01(2)(b)(i). 
208. Id. § 6.01(2)(a)(ii). 
209. Somit, supra note 191, § 5.04(3)(b). A similar concern was articulated by an Ohio 
appellate court: 
We are compelled to emphasize that while there is no evidence of any impropriety as 
to the fee arrangement here, such may not always be the result. The better practice is that 
the birth mother be solely responsible for her fees, or if the adoptive parents agree to the 
payment ofthe birth mother's attorney fees, such payments must not be contingent upon 
the outcome of placement or adoption. 
In re Adoption ofInfant Girl Banda, 559 N.E.2d 1373, 1383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). Similarly, 
in a case involving an analogous issue, a justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court noted in 
a concurrence: 
[nhe adoption agency is in the business, if you will, of obtaining babies for adoption .... 
While an agency's advising or attempting to persuade a parent to consent to termination 
of parental rights does not constitute duress ... , a mother contemplating termination of 
her parental rights needs distance from the agency .... The means available to insure that 
distance is an attorney ... not hired or paid by the adoption agency. 
In re D.J.H., 401 N.W.2d 694, 704 (N.D. 1987) (Levine, J., concurring specially) (citations 
omitted). 
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participate in the selection process, he should give the birth parent at least 
three names of experienced attorneys ... .'>210 
D. Timing of Consents 
There is nearly universal agreement that a woman should not consent to 
adoption before the birth because she cannot be sure of what her feelings will 
be after the child is born.2I1 Reportedly, some one half of the women who 
believe they have settled on adoption change their minds after the birth.212 The 
Wyoming Supreme Court noted that "[e]xperience has evidenced a host of 
cases in which a mother plans to give her unborn child to adoptive parents, 
only to change her mind after going through child-birth and the resulting 
mother-child attachment.,,213 The guide for counselors published by the 
CWLA advises counselors to make sure birth parents understand that they are 
the child's legal parents. "This means that they can see, hold, feed, or care for 
their baby. The level of contact is up to them. Many young people feel 
intimidated by those in authority and might not realize that they have these 
choices."214 
Pertman reports that "[b ]irth mothers typically want to spend time with 
their babies, and virtually all mental-health and social-work professionals 
advise them to do so. Some just hold their children for a few minutes, while 
others need days or weeks.,,215 Citing research showing "that people need to 
face the searing issues in their lives in order to work through them with a 
minimum of psychic damage," he suggests that "women who say good-bye 
without first saying hello generally can't fully process their decisions and 
therefore never come to terms with them.,,216 The birth parents' organization 
CUB recommends that women either parent their children for a week or two 
or consider a brief period of foster care.217 For mothers who are minors, a 
foster care placement for mother and child together is a possibility.218 
CUB contends that women who sign irrevocable consents in the hospital 
shortly after birth are "rushed into signing without a chance to process all of 
the information.,,219 CUB categorically advises women, "[N]ever sign papers 
210. Thompson & Reiniger, supra note 200, § 6.01(4)(a). 
211. See supra Part IV.A. 
212. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 109. 
213. In re Adoption ofBGD, 713 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Wyo. 1986). 
214. 2A ROLES, supra note 124, at 17. 
215. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 213. 
216. Id. 
217. See LOWE, supra note 133, § 10. 
218. See, e.g., Ala. Dept. of Human Res., Foster Care for Teen Mom[s 1 & Their Children, 
at http://www.dhr.state.al.us/page.asp?pageid=470 (last visited May 5, 2005) (noting that by 
providing care for a teenage mother and child, a foster family offers "a better environment in 
which a teenage mom can begin her role as a parent"). 
219. LOWE, supra note 133, § 10. 
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in the hospital. . .. Adoption is a serious matter, one that should be finalized 
only in a courtroom or a legal environment, not a recovery bed. ,,220 This 
advice is consistent with two studies in the United Kingdom concerning timing 
of consents. The researchers in those studies concluded that "most mothers 
saw six weeks after birth as a reasonable time" to be asked to give consent, 
without opportunity to revoke.221 Infants, of course, can be placed in the 
custody of their prospective adoptive parents as soon as the parties feel 
confident that the birth parents' are unlikely to change their minds. For 
example, as Triseliotis notes, a number of agencies in Scotland place newborns 
directly from the hospital even though the mother has six weeks to change her 
mind, "provided the mother's decision about the future of her baby seem[s] 
final. ,,222 
While foster care before placement is disfavored compared with care by 
the baby's mother,223 no research or historical experience suggests that a 
period of a few days to a few weeks in foster care damages newborn babies 
who then return to their birth families or move into secure "adoptive 
placements. "Attachment behavior" usually begins to appear in infants 
between six and nine months of age,224 according to the studies described in 
John Bowlby's influential works on attachment and the grief children 
experience when separated from adults to whom they are attached. Bowlby 
notes that "when infants of twenty-six weeks and less are placed in a strange 
place without [their] mother[s] they appear to accept strangers as mother-
substitutes without noticeable change in level of responsiveness and show little 
or none of the protest and fretting typical of the slightly older child. ,,225 In 
fact, "[t]hough uprooting and re-attachment carry many risks," recent studies 
"suggest that the majority of children, especially when under ... the age of 
about 9, seem to re-attach themselves to new families and do well.,,226 In 
international adoptions of very young children, children typically join their 
adoptive families weeks or months after birth.227 In domestic adoptions in the 
220. Id. 
221. TIuSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 98. The mothers were interviewed shortly after 
the birth of their children and again six months later. Id. 
222. Id. at 62. 
223. See id. at 63 ("Temporary placement in a foster home is not good from the child's 
point of view, but this is sometimes inevitable to allow more time to the mother in which to 
make up her mind or for the father to be located and to make up his mind."). 
224. 1 JOHN BOWLBY, AITACHMENT AND Loss 200-201 (2d ed. 1982). 
225. 3 id. at 434 (1980). "From the age of seven months onwards however a child in this 
situation not only notices the change but, by protest and crying and also by persistent fretting 
and rejection of the strange nurses, indicates his intense dislike of it.'" 3 id. 
226. TIuSEUOTIS ET AL., supra note 81, at 36. 
227. For example, the author of Fast Track Adoption explains to prospective adoptive 
parents that a disadvantage of international adoption is the fact that "because complexities in 
law and procedures can produce many delays, there are few opportunities to adopt a newborn." 
BURNS, supra note 93, at 11. 
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past, many children were kept in care for six to nine months before placement 
in an effort to insure their physical and mental fitness.228 As noted in Melosh' s 
historical account, 
[w]hile early placements appear to be typical now in the private adoption of 
domestically born infants, periods in temporary foster care were common in 
the past, both as a "safe-guard against hasty and ill-considered 
relinquishments" and to study the child's development in order to make sure 
that the child was fit to be adopted.229 
v. STATE LAWS 
The legal rules on the timing of consents are ultimately a compromise 
between the interest in protecting biological mothersfrom making hasty 
or ill-informed decisions at a time of great physical and emotional 
stress, and the interest in expediting the adoption process for 
newborns. 230 
Joan Heifetz Hollinger 
The variety of state laws presents a complex picture, but in sharp contrast 
to the laws of many other countries,231 a majority of the laws provide for the 
possibility of irrevocable consent within a week of the birth. In recent years, 
the amendments to state adoption law timing requirements have generally 
shortened periods of time before which mothers may give consent and during 
which they may revoke. A majority of the laws do not require that consent be 
given in court or before an official appointed by a court or another state 
official. More than half of the states have some kind of statutory provision 
regarding counseling.232 A handful of states require separate representation for 
birth parents or for birth parents who are minors.233 The following bulleted list 
provides a summary of state laws governing mothers' consents.234 
228. MELOSH, supra note 75, at 29-31. 
229. Id. Melosh describes one agency's practices in the 1930s which "did not accept 
relinquishments until the babies had been determined 'fit' for adoption. . .. Therefore, the 
agency never placed children under six months of age; usually, children who came into the 
bureau's care as newborns were not placed in adoptive homes until they were nine months to 
a year old." Id.; see also id. at 38 ("Until after World War II, child welfare professionals 
counseled that adoptive placements should not take place until the children were at least six 
months old, allowing time for close observation and scientific testing."). 
230. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Consent to Adoption, in 1 ADoPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 6, § 2.1 1 (1)(a). 
231. See supra Part II. 
232. For a history of consent laws, see Cahn, supra note 147, at 1118-26. 
233. See supra Part IV.C. 
234. In this bulleted list and throughout this Article, a consent is identified as revocable 
rather than irrevocable only when a mother has an unqualified right to revoke, not a "right to 
, 
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• In nine states, the mother may give irrevocable consent any time after 
birth,235 and in a number of those states, consent may be given even before 
birth if it is followed by a post-birth reaffirmation or ratification.236 
• In three states, the mother may consent before birth. In Colorado she may 
revoke within four days after the birth; in Alabama she may revoke within 
five days; and in Washington she may revoke until the court approves the 
consent after a hearing, which may not be held sooner than two days after 
the birth.237 
• In twenty-one states, the mother's consent is irrevocable when given but 
cannot be given for a specified period after birth: twelve hours in Kansas, 
twenty-four hours in Utah, two days in four states, three days in ten states, 
four days in Massachusetts, five days in Louisiana, seven days in 
Michigan, and fifteen days in Rhode Island.238 In Wisconsin the 
revoke" that merely triggers a best interests contest between the mother and the prospective 
adoptive parents. See infra Part VI.C. (describing "best interests" provisions and contests). 
The total number of states in this bulleted list exceeds fifty because it includes the District 
of Columbia and because a small number of states have different rules for agency and 
independent adoptions and therefore appear on the list more than once. The numbers of states 
in different categories are excellent, useful approximations but are unlikely to be one hundred 
percent accurate because of possible changes in state laws and because they are based on two 
published summaries of state law, with examination of state statutes in instances in which the 
summaries are either unclear or inconsistent. 
235. These states are California (in agency adoptions), Hawaii (consent to adoption 
irrevocable after placement), Idaho, Indiana, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, and Wyoming. 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l 
Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see also HAw. REv. STAT. § 578-2 (2005) (party executing 
consent not required to appear in court); IDAHO CODE § 16-1506(2) (Supp. 2004) (same as 
Hawaii); In re Steve B.D., 723 P.2d 829, 835 (Idaho 1986) (holding that when consent is 
executed and the child is delivered to prospective adoptive parents, revocation triggers only a 
best interest inquiry). 
236. HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 571-61, -63 (2005) (providing that parents may petition to 
terminate their parental rights after the sixth month of pregnancy, but judgment may not be 
entered until after birth and a written reaffirmation); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15.1-01 to -03 
(2004) (providing that when the adopters have been selected by the birth parent, consent may 
be executed and filed before birth, with a hearing held no sooner than forty-eight hours after 
birth at which the court may require the birth parent to be present or may determine validity of 
consent without the birth parent present); People ex rei Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 
N.Y.S.2d613, 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (suggesting that pre-birth consent maybe reaffirmed 
or ratified after birth); see infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text (discussing an Indiana 
case in which the mother ratified her pre-birth consent after the birth). 
237. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-103.5 (2004); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.33.090 (2000); 
1 ADoPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra 
note 6. 
238. Florida (or when notified in writing of being fit to be released from the hospital, 
whichever is earlier), Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas (agency adoptions), (two days); Arizona 
(or pre-birth, with post-birth ratification), Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New 
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irrevocable consent is given at a court hearing that is set within thirty days 
of a request for the hearing, but not before the birth.239 
In seven states, the consent may be given immediately after birth but is 
revocable without qualification for a specified period: seven days in 
North Carolina; ten days in Arkansas and Georgia; fourteen days in 
Delaware; thirty days in Maryland; and in Alaska, until the court in which 
the adoption petition has been filed issues an order approving a 
guardian.240 
In thirteen states, consent may not be given for a specified period after 
birth, and once it is given it may be revoked without qualification for a 
period of time. The revocation periods are measured in fixed increments 
in most of the states but in others are pegged to the happening of events, 
such as court approvals of consents. For those states in which the 
minimum period of combined time can be calculated, the number of days 
before which consent may become irrevocable ranges from seven to 
approximately thirty-five days.241 Under the federal Indian Child Welfare 
Act, consent given within ten days of birth of an Indian child is invalid, 
and a valid consent may be withdrawn "at any time" prior to the entry of 
a final decree of adoption. 242 
• Ten state statutes require, either in some or in all types of adoptions, the 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, West Virginia, (three days). I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see infra notes 262-65, 
407-08 and accompanying text (describing current Texas and Florida law); see also In re 
Adoption of Kreuger, 448 P.2d 82, 86 (Ariz. 1968) (providing that voidable pre-birth consent 
"may be ratified by a subsequent act which sufficiently manifests a present intention to 
consent"). 
239. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.41, .837 (2003). 
240. I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for 
Adoption, supra note 6; see infra note 255 and accompanying text (providing more information 
on current North Carolina law). 
241. Iowa (seven days); Texas (in independent adoptions, twelve days, unless document 
that specifies the consent is irrevocable for a specified period up to sixty days); District of 
Columbia (thirteen days); Tennessee (fourteen days); Minnesota (approximately seventeen 
days, including a revocation period of ten working days); Vermont (twenty-two and a half 
days); Kentucky (twenty-three days); Virginia (twenty-five days); Pennsylvania (thirty-three 
days); California (in independent adoptions, the mother may not consent until discharged from 
the hospital or if her stay in the hospital is longer than five days, until she obtains from a 
physician a statement of competence to consent, plus a thirty-day revocation period, unless it 
is waived); Missouri (mother may not consent for two days, with consent revocable until 
reviewed and accepted by a judge); Connecticut (two days must pass before mother may 
consent, which remains revocable until approved by a court); South Dakota (mother may not 
consent for five days, revocable until final decree). I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see infra notes 258-61,262-65, 
271-73 and accompanying text (describing the current laws in Tennessee, Texas, and 
Pennsylvania). 
242. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a)-(b) (2001). 
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birth mother's consent to be taken in the presence of a judge, juvenile 
court referee, or a court's authorized agent.243 The federal Indian Child 
Welfare Act requires execution of consent in writing before a judge.244 
Ten states require counseling for birth parents in some orin all adoptions. 
Some of those states specify requisite amounts of counseling and some specify 
the timing of the counseling.245 Twenty states have statutory requirements that 
birth parents in some or all types of adoptions be made aware of the fact that 
counseling is available, with two states specifying counseling by a licensed 
adoption agency. Only a handful of these states specify how much counseling 
should be offered or mandate the counselor's qualifications or affiliations.246 
243. Alabama (pre-birth consent, probate judge); Idaho (district judge, magistrate of a 
district court, or equivalent judicial officer); Maine (probate judge); Michigan (judge or juvenile 
court referee); New Mexico (judge, unless parent is represented by independent counsel); North 
Dakota (court); Oklahoma (judge); Vermont (probate judge or court's authorized agent); 
Virginia (independent adoption, court); Wisconsin (court). 1 ADoPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE 
§ 16-2005 (Michie Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35A-5-23 (Michie,1964). 
In Illinois, the mother must execute her consent before one ofa list of persons, including a 
representative of a licensed agency. These options include: 
the presiding judge of the court in which the petition for adoption has been, or is to be filed 
or before any other judge or hearing officer designated or subsequently approved by the 
court, or the circuit clerk if so authorized by the presiding judge or, except as otherwise 
provided in this Act, before a representative of the Department of Children and Family 
Services or a licensed child welfare agency, or before social service personnel under the 
jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction, or before social service personnel ofthe 
Cook County Department of Supportive Services designated by the presiding judge. 
750 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 50/10 (West Supp. 2004). 
244. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a). 
245. Connecticut (counseling within seventy-two hours of birth or as soon as medically 
possible by a person with a masters or doctoral degree from an accredited college or university); 
District of Columbia (for agency adoptions, counseling by a professional social worker 
regarding alternative services available, in addition to psychological and emotional counseling); 
Louisiana (two sessions with a licensed counselor before consenting); Massachusetts (for 
agency adoptions, education and counseling by a licensed clinician adequate to enable an 
informed decision); Montana (three hours prior to consenting); Nebraska (minimum of four 
hours of "education and support" services); Nevada (meeting with a licensed social worker 
specializing in adoption prior to reaching decision); New Mexico (if eighteen years of age or 
older, a minimum of one session not in the presence of her parents; if seventeen or younger, two 
sessions; court may waive); Ohio (minimum one session completed at least seventy-two hours 
before consenting); South Dakota; and Texas (does not require counseling per se but requires 
that agencies must meet with birth parents two times before placement or document why this 
is not possible). Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1406(b) 
(2001); infra notes 459-61 and accompanying text (providing more information on California's 
law). 
246. California (in independent adoptions, a minimum of three sessions by a counselor 
with no contractual relationship with the adoptive parents or their attorney or any other 
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States that have sharply limited consent or revocation periods in recent 
years include Colorado, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina.247 In 
2003 Colorado established an expedited procedure for relinquishing parental 
rights of children younger than one year of age. 248 Before the new law, when 
a petition for relinquishment of parental rights was filed, the court scheduled 
a hearing at which the parent appeared and the court determined whether the 
parent had been counseled as well as whether "[t]he parent's decision to 
relinquish is knowing and voluntary.,,249 Under the new law, the parent may 
sign an affidavit before the child's birth.250 The affidavit, with the petition to 
adopt, may be filed four days after the birth and once filed is irrevocable.251 
individual or organization perfonning a service for them for a fee); Colorado (mother advised 
of "opportunity to seek independent counseling"); Florida; Iowa (counseling by a person 
qualified under Department of Human Services rules, with a requirement of a minimum number 
of hours of training); Maine (counselor certified by a licensed agency or the state's Department 
of Human Resources); Michigan; Maryland; Minnesota (up to thirty-five hours, available from 
conception until six months after birth); Missouri; New Hampshire; New Jersey (counseling by 
a licensed adoption agency); New York (counseling by a licensed adoption agency); 
Pennsylvania (court inquires about whether counseling has been received and, if not, whether 
counseling is needed; court also has a referral list and funding available ifbirth parent cannot 
afford counseling); Tennessee; Utah; Vennont; Virginia; Washington (mother advised that 
financial assistance may be available through state and local governmental agencies); West 
Virginia; and Wyoming. Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see also COLO. REv. STAT. 
§ 19-5-103.5(I)(b)(l) (2004); IOWA CODE § 600A.4(2)(d) (Supp. 2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18-A, § 9-202(b)(I) (1964); WASH. REv. CODE § 26. 133. 160(4)(h)(I) (2000). 
New Mexico, which requires one or two counseling sessions, see supra note 245, also 
requires that the counseling be by "a certified counselor ofthe person's choice," and specifies 
that "[c]ounseling may be provided by a counselor, the department or an agency," defining a 
"counselor" as "a person certified by the department to conduct adoption counseling in 
independent adoptions." N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3(J), 32A-5-21(A)(5), 32A-5-22(G) 
(Michie 2004). 
247. In 1986 the Idaho Supreme Court also sharply limited birth mothers' opportunities 
to have a court set aside their consents when it substituted a best interests standard for an 
estoppel rule. See In re Steve B.D., 723 P.2d 829,835 (Idaho 1986). Under the estoppel rule, 
a mother had been permitted to revoke her consent during the pendency of the adoption 
proceeding if not estopped from doing so. Id. at 832. To detennine whether she was estopped, 
the courts had considered a list of factors: 
"the circumstances under which the consent was given; the length of time elapsing, and 
the conduct of the parties, between the giving of consent and the attempted withdrawal; 
whether or not the withdrawal was made before or after the institution of adoption 
proceedings; the nature of the natural parent's conduct with respectto the child both before 
and after consenting to its adoption; and the 'vested rights' of the proposed adoptive 
parents with respect to the child." 
Id. (quoting In re Anderson, 589 P.2d 957, 963 (Idaho 1978)). 
248. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-103.5. 
249. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-103(7)(a)(II) (2004). 
250. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-103.5(1)(b)(I). 
251. COLO. REV . STAT. §§ 19-5-103.5(1 )(b )(IV), -104(7)(a)(2004). The statute requires 
546 TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 72:509 
Louisiana has dealt with independent adoptions by moving in stages from 
permitting birth parents to revoke consent any time before a final decree to 
making consents irrevocable if given more than four days after birth.252 In 
1960 Louisiana's cut-off for revocation was changed from the final to the 
interlocutory decree,253 and in 1979, to thirty days, with revocation triggering 
a best interest determination rather than automatic return of the child.254 North 
Carolina shortened its period for revocation in a series of reductions, 
ultimately reducing the pre-1983 period of six months to the present period of 
seven days.255 In South Carolina before 1986, the state courts had discretion 
to permit revocation of consent until the final decree of adoption, although the 
state supreme court noted in 1985 that '''the more modem trend disallows the 
revocation of consent voluntarily given particularly where the adoptive parents 
have taken the child into their home in reliance upon the consent. ",256 By 
statute since 1986, South Carolina does not permit revocation of a voluntary 
consent given any time after the birth.257 
Tennessee and Texas have recently limited their consent or revocation 
periods but nonetheless retain periods considerably longer than average. 
Tennessee law prior to 1986 provided a right to revoke consent for periods of 
thirty and ninety days respectively in agency and independent adoptions?58 
From 1986 to 1995, the periods were each reduced to fifteen days and limited 
that the affidavit advise the parent that consent may be withdrawn anytime before it is filed with 
the petition in court, but it does not state that the affidavit must inform the parent that the 
affidavit and petition may be filed four days after the birth. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-
1 03.5( I )(b )(I)-(II). Apparently, there had been delays in scheduling the court hearings at which 
parents would appear and be examined by the court. Telephone Interview with Karen Kottmeir, 
Participant in Lobbying Efforts (Nov. 4, 2003). Rather than addressing the problem of the 
delays and adopting time limits within which hearings must be set, the law eliminated the 
hearings and provided for pre-birth consents. 
252. LA. CH. CODE. arts. 1123, 1130 (2004). 
253. See Moreland v. Craft, 244 So. 2d 37, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1971). 
254. See In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1007 (La. 1988). In 1970 additional safeguards 
were added; the birth mother may not consent before the fifth day after birth and must be 
represented by an attorney at the execution of the consent. /d. 
255. Consent is required in independent adoptions and agency adoptions in which the 
mother has not already relinquished the child to an agency. The time during which consent 
could be revoked was reduced in 1983 from six to three months. 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 
83, § 1. In 1987 it was reduced to thirty days if consent was given to the director of Social 
Services ofa licensed child placing agency. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 541, § 1. In 1991 it was 
reduced to thirty days in all circumstances. 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 667, § 1. In 1995 it was 
reduced to twenty-one days if the child was younger than three months old and otherwise to 
seven days. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 457, § 2. In 2001 it was reduced to seven days in all 
circumstances. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 150, § 10. 
256. Phillips v. Baker, 325 S.E.2d 533, 535 (S.C. 1985) (quoting Ellison v. Camby, 236 
S.E.2d 197, 198 (S.c. 1977». 
257. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1720 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004). 
258. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-1I7(b)(1984). 
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to situations in which an adoption petition had not yet been filed.259 Under 
current law, a mother may not surrender her child until the fourth day after 
birth and may revoke her consent within ten days,260 gaining return of the child 
unless "the child would likely suffer immediate harm to the child's health and 
safety. ,,261 In 1995 Texas instituted a forty-eight-hour waiting period before 
parents may relinquish.262 In 1997 it eliminated an option of making 
relinquishments in independent adoptions revocable until the termination of 
parental rights or the decree of adoption.263 Instead, Texas made these 
relinquishments either (1) revocable for ten days or (2) irrevocable, as was 
previously permitted, for a period stated in the document, up to sixty days in 
length.264 In an earlier period, parental consents in independent adoptions had 
been revocable until the final decree.265 
In Maryland in recent years, the legislature has rejected repeated attempts 
to shorten the state's thirty-day revocation period,266 which was reduced from 
ninety to thirty days in 1992.267 Bills were unsuccessfully introduced in 1996 
seeking to reduce the period to seven days, in 1997 to eight days, in 2000 to 
fifteen days, and in 2003 to fourteen days.268 Like Maryland, California and 
Pennsylvania are among the states that have the very longest revocation 
periods in the nation, but they have shortened their periods in recent years. In 
1994 California shortened the revocation period in independent adoptions 
from 120 days to ninety days and shortened it again in 2001 from ninety days 
to thirty days.269 In California the mother can waive the revocation period 
available in independent adoptions; however, California law affords a number 
of additional safeguards to promote deliberate and final decisions.27o 
259. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-117(b) (Supp. 1989). 
260. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-111(d)(3), -112(a)(l)(A) (2001 & Supp. 2004). 
261. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-112(e)(2)(A) (2001). 
262. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16l.l03(a)(l) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05)(Historical 
and Statutory Notes). 
263. See 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 561, § 9. 
264. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 16l.l03, .1035 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05). 
265. Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1966). 
266. MD. CODEANN.,FAM. LAW § 5-311(c)(2004). 
267. 1992 Md. Laws 511. 
268. H.B. 882,2004 Leg., 418th Sess. (Md.); H.B. 61, 2000 Leg., 414th Sess. (Md.); H.B. 
1382,1997 Leg., 41lth Sess. (Md.); H.B. 550,1996 Leg., 410th Sess. (Md.). 
269. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5(b) (West 2004) (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
270. For example, waiver of the right to consent may only be signed in the presence of 
designated authorities and may not be signed before an interview by a designated authority. 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814.5(a)(2)(A), (c). In independent adoptions, adoption providers are 
required to advise birth parents of alternatives to adoption; alternative types of adoptions; their 
"right to separate legal counsel paid for by the prospective adoptive parents"; and their right to 
a minimum of three counseling sessions, paid for by the prospective adoptive parents and given 
by a counselor who does not have a contractual relationship with the adoptive parents, the 
adoptive parents' attorney, or any other individual or organization performing a service for the 
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Pennsylvania recently made its period for revocation both more definite and 
in some cases shorter. Before mid-2004, consent could not be given less than 
seventy-two hours after birth and could be revoked until the earlier of either 
the termination of parental rights or the decree of adoption,271 a period of time 
that could be several weeks or months.272 While consent still may not be given 
sooner than seventy-two hours after birth, the period for withdrawal is now set 
at thirty days.273 
VI. PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE 
I have heard of cases in North America, tragically, in which adoption 
consents have been signed even before the birth, or very soon after the 
birth. I have also heard of cases where attempts to revoke the consent 
the day after it had been signed have failed. 274 
Evelyn Robinson, Australian social worker and author 
What can be learned from appellate opinions about circumstances that 
have led to conflicts between adoptive parents and mothers who initially 
consented but then attempted to withdraw their consent to the adoption oftheir 
newborn infants? Litigated cases that resulted in appellate decisions do not 
necessarily represent every type of situation in which conflicts arise or the 
relative incidence of different situations, and some decisions reveal little of the 
circumstances that led to the litigation. The opinions nonetheless provide a 
valuable account of troubling cases and a valuable resource for contemplating 
whether following the best practices discussed in Part IV could have prevented 
conflicts, and if so, whether different legal rules could have promoted these 
practices. 
The stories that appellate opinions relate fall roughly into four distinct 
categories. In one group of cases, the dominant reported fact is that consent 
was signed within hours or within a day or two of birth and, very often, was 
almost immediately regretted. In another group, two different but interrelated 
adoptive parents for a fee. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5(c), (e) (West 2004). Also, the adoption 
service provider must offer to interview birth parents within ten days after the placement for 
adoption, at which interview the provider re-advises birth parents of their rights, but if the 
interview does not take place, the provider is to notify designated authorities. CAL. F AM. CODE 
§ 8801. 7 (West 2004). 
271. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c) (West 2001). 
272. See Martha Raffaele, Law Limits Withdrawing Consent for Adoption, INTELLIGENCER 
J. (Lancaster, Pa.), Mar. 30,2004, at All. In agency adoptions, the earliest a hearing could be 
held on a parent's petition to relinquish was thirteen days after the birth. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § § 2501 ( a), 2503( a )(West 2001). In an independent adoption, the earliest a hearing could 
be held on such a petition was forty-three days. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2502(a), 2503(a) 
(West 2001). 
273. 2004 Pa. Legis. Servo 21, § 2711 (West). 
274. ROBINSON, supra note 56, at 2. 
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factors are prominent. One factor is a failure either to initiate communication 
or resolve conflicts among the mother, father, and family members. The other 
factor is a lack oftimely awareness of resources available to the mother to help 
her raise her child. In a third and somewhat different group of cases, mothers 
made timely revocations under what were apparently confusing laws that may 
invite litigation because they permit "revocation" but dictate judicial "best 
interests determinations" rather than return of the children. In these cases, 
courts engage in what would be considered an unlawful exercise in other 
circumstances, that is, deciding whether the child should be raised by a fit 
biological parent or by unrelated third parties with whom the child has lived 
for at most a few days or weeks before the revocation. Finally, a fourth source 
of conflict is apparent in situations in which mothers have consented in 
reliance on open adoption arrangements that are not legally enforceable. In 
each group of cases, the mothers almost without exception did not give their 
consents in person either before a judge or before an official designated by a 
court or another government agency. 
A. Quick Consents, Quick Regrets 
In the first group of reported cases, we learn merely that the mother 
consented shortly after birth and soon regretted her decision, a decision that 
might or might not have been different had the law required a longer period 
of time before consent could be given or could become irrevocable. It appears 
that these adoptions generally were not conducted in ways that facilitated 
deliberate and firm decisions. In most of the cases, the mothers received no 
counseling, and in almost all of them, they did not have legal representation. 
In the cases in which the mother received some counseling, it was generally 
either with adoption agency representatives or through very brief contacts with 
hospital social workers. In two of the cases, the social workers were actually 
colleagues of one of the prospective adoptive parents. 
In some of the cases, the irrevocable consent was given within one to four 
days after birth, even though the possibility of adoption was discussed for the 
first time after the birth. In a 2001 Mississippi case, In re Adoption of 
J.MM,275 the sixteen-year-old mother hid her pregnancy from her parents 
until she gave birth in their home.276 In the ensuing upheaval, her family 
immediately contacted a private adoption agency whose representatives visited 
her twice that day, took custody of the baby the next day, and as permitted by 
Mississippi law, obtained her signature on the irrevocable surrender two days 
later. 277 The consent document was notarized by a representative of the 
agency.278 In the court's opinion, there was no indication that the mother was 
275. 796 So. 2d 975 (Miss. 2001). 
276. Id. at 977. 
277. Jd. at 978. 
278. Jd. 
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offered counseling or that she had legal representation.279 She unsuccessfully 
appealed the adoption decree, which was entered less than thirty days after she 
signed the consent, on the grounds that she had signed under duress or as a 
result of undue influence and that her constitutional rights had been violated 
by the court's failure to rule on her motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for 
her.280 
An older mother in a 2001 Texas case gave birth at home and then drove 
herself, the infant, and her older children to the hospital.281 She "told hospital 
employees that she was divorced, was having financial difficulties, and did not 
think she could take care of another child.,,282 After discussions with a social 
worker contacted by the hospital, the mother on the second day after the birth 
signed an affidavit of relinquishment, giving a private agency the right to place 
the child for adoption.283 She had no legal representation.284 Under state law, 
her consent was irrevocable because it was given to a licensed agency more 
than forty-eight hours after the birth.285 
A 1993 dispute in Missouri involved an older mother who feared her child 
would have Down's Syndrome and whose doctor believed, because of 
complications during pregnancy, that the child might be stillbom.286 During 
her labor, she told a nurse she did not think she could "handle" a child with 
mental disabilities.287 A few hours after she gave birth to a healthy baby girl, 
a nurse at the hospital called a fellow employee who wished to adopt.288 The 
fellow employee then called the hospital social worker, who told him "they 
had not been able to get a commitment from the mother.,,289 The next 
morning, he and his wife brought a consent form to the hospital and asked the 
social worker to obtain the mother's consent. "Approximately 20 to 30 
minutes later, [the social worker] returned with the consent form signed and 
notarized.,,290 Later that day, the couple took the baby home to Arkansas, 
where they petitioned to adopt the child. Two days after they took the baby, 
279. See id. at 977-78. 
280. Id. at 980-83. 
281. Denman v. Alternatives in Motion, No. 14-99-01262-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 
336, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 18,2001). 
282. Id. at *1-2. 
283. Id. at *2. 
284. See id. at *1-3. 
285. See id. at *2 nn.l & 3. Had the relinquishment been given in an independent 
adoption, it could have provided that it was irrevocable for a stated period up to sixty days; 
however, ifit did not include such a provision, it would have been revocable for ten days. TEx. 
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.103(e)-(f), .1035 (Vernon 2002). 
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the mother contacted an attorney, seeking the return of her child.291 More than 
two and a half years later, the Missouri Supreme Court remanded the case for 
a custody decision that would tum on the child's best interests.292 
In a 1989 West Virginia case, although the mother was counseled before 
the birth by a state protective services worker, the possibility of relinquishment 
was not mentioned to her.293 The day after the birth, the mother signed a form 
placing the child in foster care while she considered adoption; three days later, 
she signed the relinquishment form; seven days later, she asked if the baby 
could be returned to her.294 Approximately three weeks after she made her 
request, the child was placed for adoption.295 The trial court held that she had 
not been subjected to the kind of duress that invalidates consent,296 and the 
affirming appellate court noted that her "beliefthat she had ten days to retrieve 
the child appears to stem from a lack of attention on her part.,,297 "[I]t appears 
that if there was a misunderstanding, it stems primarily from both [her] and her 
mother's failure to listen to Ms. Velas when [Ms. Vel as] explained the 
relinquishment papers. ,,298 
Quick changes of heart after giving consent also occurred in cases in 
which, although adoption had been contemplated before the birth, there was 
no indication in the opinions that the mothers were offered or received 
counseling services. The birth mother in a 2003 Indiana case made 
arrangements before the birth with the prospective adoptive parents, one of 
whom worked with her maternal grandmother.299 She signed the consent 
prepared by the adoptive parents' attorney approximately six weeks before the 
birth and "ratified" it after the birth,300 as permitted by judicial decision in 
Indiana and perhaps in a small number of other states.301 She ratified it by 
delivering the child into the custody of the prospective adoptive parents, who 
took the child home from the hospital. 302 Thirteen days later, the mother and 
291. Jd. 
292. Id. at 71. The Missouri Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of 
(l) whether to permit revocation of consent, keeping at the "pinnacle" of the decision the 
child's best interests, and (2) whether the child's best interests would be served by remaining 
with the prospective adoptive parents; by being returned to the mother or the father, with whom 
the mother lived; or by some other disposition. Id. at 70-71. The basis for the ruling was the 
parties' failure to comply with state law requirements for transferring custody of the child and 
for removing the child from Missouri to Arkansas. See id. at 66-70. 
293. Baby Boy R. v. Velas, 386 S.E.2d 839,840 (W.Va. 1989). 
294. Id. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 840-41. 
297. Id. at 843. 
298. Id. at 842. 
299. In re Adoption ofInfant Child Baxter, 799 N.E.2d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2003). 
300. Id. at 1059. 
301. Jd. at 1061-62 (citing cases in accord from Arizona, Florida, and New York). 
302. Jd. at 1059. 
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father changed their minds, but under the state's law, their consent was 
irrevocable.303 The mother and her mother contacted the prospective adoptive 
parents "on several occasions in the weeks following the child's birth in an 
attempt to revoke ... consent to the adoption and reclaim custody of the child. 
These informal efforts failed."304 
In two Florida cases, the mothers likewise made adoption arrangements 
before the births of their children and also apparently received no 
counseling.305 The mother in a 1988 case did not have independent 
representation, but the attorney acting as an intermediary had "explained the 
available options" to her.306 She also had a mandatory interview with a state 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services caseworker "to insure that 
[her] consent was informed and voluntary.,,307 She consented to the adoption 
the day after the birth but on the following day asked the attorney to void her 
consent. 308 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of her habeas corpus 
petition, despite what it viewed as a "harsh result.,,309 
In a case decided three years earlier, the mother in an independent 
adoption consented several hours after the birth, which the prospective 
adoptive mother had traveled from Florida to Pennsylvania to attend.3lO The 
third day after the birth, the mother's attorney told the prospective adoptive 
mother that the mother had changed her mind.3II "Nevertheless, [the 
prospective adoptive mother] departed with the child as planned," and the 
Florida courts later entered and affirmed a final judgment of adoption. 312 
The mother in a 1996 Texas case had responded to a New York couple's 
advertisement in TV Guide, had visited the couple, and had arranged with them 
for the adoption of her unborn child.313 She signed the relinquishment twenty-
six hours after the birth but changed her mind shortly thereafter.314 There is 
no indication that she had independent legal representation or was offered 
303. See id. at 1060. 
304. In re Adoption ofInfant Child Baxter, 778 N.E.2d 417, 419-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
305. Hindman v. Bischoff, 534 So. 2d 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); In re Adoption of 
c.L.W., 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
306. Hindman, 534 So. 2d at 744. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 




313. Sims v. Adoption Alliance, 922 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). 
314. See id. Texas cases with similar facts include Swinney v. Mosher, 830 S. W.2d 187, 
190 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), in which the court found that the birth mother signed the consent 
documents on the day after the birth and advised the adoptive parents on the day after signing 
the consent that she had changed her mind and In re c.T., 749 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1988), in which the court found that the birth mother signed the consent on the fourth day after 
the birth and attempted to have the child returned the next day. 
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counseling.315 To the contrary, the agency arranging the adoption-apparently 
knowing she had changed her mind-"made every effort to finalize the 
adoption" in the two weeks following her consent before a new law would 
apply and impose a forty-eight-hour waiting period.316 The agency's failure 
to meet this deadline led to the reversal of the lower court's termination of 
parental rights, an outcome that the concurring justice found "tragic.,,3J7 He 
lamented, "If the affidavit had been signed twenty-two (22) hours later than 
it was, Baby Girl Sims would remain the adopted daughter of her new and 
obviously very devoted and loving parents.,,318 
In a 1997 New York case, the mother gave her consent approximately 
eleven hours after the birth, while "crying and shaking" and "so anxious to 
leave [the hospital] that she ... did not read the documents.,,319 The mother 
had responded to a newspaper advertisement and met with the prospective 
adoptive parents about five months before the birth.320 The prospective 
adoptive parents' attorney told the birth mother that she could select an 
attorney herself, but the attorney also recommended one.32I She met with the 
recommended attorney, whose fees were paid by the prospective adoptive 
parents.322 She did not read the documents she signed, and the attorney did not 
read them to her or explain them.323 The court, expressing disapproval of 
consents executed just hours or a few days after birth, held the consent invalid 
because it did not comply with the statutory requirements that the document 
be explained to the birth mother and that she be given a copy.324 
In a 1990 New York case, the mother gave her consent two days after the 
birth but revoked it before the prospective adoptive parents took custody the 
following day.325 The intermediate court found that the birth mother's lawyer 
had violated New York law by providing legal services to both her and the 
prospective adoptive parents and that he had physically transferred the baby 
"in flagrant disregard of [her] instructions. ,,326 The court of appeals approved 
the trial court's return of the child,327 although as the dissent in the court below 
315. Sims, 922 S.W.2d at 214-15. 
316. Id. at217. 
317. Id.at218. 
318. Id. 
319. In re Adoption of Baby Boy, 667 N.Y.S.2d 635,638 (Sur. Ct. 1997). 
320. See id. at 637. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
323. See id. at 637-38. 
324. See id. at 640-41. 
325. See In re Adoption of Samuel, 562 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
326. Id. 
327. In re Samuel, 581 N.E.2d 1338, 1339 (N.Y. 1991)(holding that her attorney did not 
have the authority under the circumstances to place the child). 
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had noted, timely revocation under New York law ordinarily requires a best 
interests hearing rather than return of the child.328 
In other cases, mothers had a number of meetings with agency workers or 
were offered some kind of counseling. In a Nebraska case decided in 1995, 
a mother of four children decided on adoption before the birth because "she 
did not feel she could or wanted to raise another child. ,,329 She contacted the 
private adoption agency some four months before the birth and met with 
agency employees on five occasions.33o She did not have legal representation, 
and the day after the birth she consented to the adoption in the presence of 
agencyemployees.331 Less than three days later, she requested that the child 
be returned.332 The Nebraska Court of Appeals rejected her claim that she had 
328. See Samuel, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 280 (Pine, J., dissenting). The court of appeals insisted 
that it was not altering the law: 
As respondent urges, it would be absurd to conclude that every consent that is privately 
signed and immediately withdrawn by a birth parent nonetheless triggers the fonnal 
revocation mechanism that puts a birth parent on equal footing with a potential adoptive 
parent. ... 
. . . We emphasize that, contrary to appellants' argument, our analysis adds no 
requirement of delivery of the consent document, or any other requirement to the statute. 
Samuel, 581 N.E.2d at 1339. 
In cases in Oregon and Washington, mothers attempted to revoke their consents by invoking 
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (lCW A). The fifteen-year-old mother in the 1994 Oregon 
case signed a relinquishment on the day ofthe birth and thirteen days later filed a document 
seeking to revoke her consent. In re Adoption of Quinn, 881 P.2d 795, 797-98 (Or. 1994). She 
also had contacted the prospective adoptive parents before the birth. Id. at 797. The 
prospective parents had hired a separate lawyer for her to advise her about the adoption process. 
Id. In the ensuing litigation, she claimed, contrary to an earlier assertion, that the ICWA 
applied to the adoption. Id. at 798, 799. Under the ICWA, binding consent may not be given 
for ten days after birth, and a birth parent may revoke consent until the final decree of adoption, 
25 U.S.c. § I 913(a), (c)(2000), but the Supreme Court of Oregon ultimately held thatthere had 
not been sufficient admissible evidence introduced to establish that the ICWA applied. Quinn, 
881 P.2d at 801. 
In the 1992 Washington case in which the mother received counseling and consulted with 
family, friends, and women who had placed their children for adoption, the mother signed a 
consent two weeks before the birth. In re Adoption ofInfant Boy Crews, 825 P .2d 305, 306-07 
(Wash. 1992). The court approved the consent two days after the birth, and the mother 
requested the return ofthe child either four or eight days later. Id. at 307. The Supreme Court 
of Washington held that the ICWA does not apply when the child is "not being removed from 
an Indian cultural setting" and that even if it applied, it would not invalidate the concluded 
tennination of parental rights. Id. at 310-1 I. 
329. Jones v. Child Saving Inst., No. A-94-710, 1995 Neb. App. LEXIS 117, at *5 (Neb. 
Ct. App. Apr. 4, \995). 
330. Id. 
331. Id. at *7-8. 
332. Jd. at * I. 
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not understood the finality of her consent and concluded that "[ a] change of 
mind is not sufficient to invalidate a relinquishment. ,,333 
In an earlier case in which the mother decided on adoption during her 
pregnancy, the mother met many times with the private adoption agency 
director, who was also a caseworker.334 At the first meeting, the caseworker 
testified that "he showed [her] all the documents she ultimately signed and ... 
they went over the documents in detail. ,,335 The mother signed the required 
forms in the hospital two days after the birth.336 Two days later she requested 
the return of her baby.337 She claimed she had been told she would have six 
months to change her mind; the agency director testified that he had explained 
that the adoptive parents would finalize the adoption in six months.338 The 
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that she failed to satisfy her burden of 
proving that the relinquishment was involuntary.339 
The mother in a 1998 Oregon case consented on the day after the birth to 
what was to be an open adoption arrangement, but nine days later she 
delivered a written revocation to the adoption agency.340 A couple of months 
before the birth, she had contacted the agency because it arranged open 
adoptions in which birth parents could "have an ongoing relationship with the 
child and the adoptive parents.,,341 She had met the prospective adoptive 
parents twice and spoken with them in telephone calls.342 After the birth, the 
adoption agency counselor read the required documents to her but did not 
explain them.343 The mother, who did not have legal representation, believed 
on the basis of previous explanations that she had six months during which she 
could revoke her consent, becoming liable for all costS.344 She retained 
counsel and filed objections in the two counties in which she believed the 
adoption petition might be filed. 345 It was in a third county that the petition 
was subsequently filed and concluded, as permitted by the documents she had 
signed, without notice to her.346 She sued to set the adoption aside.347 Two 
and a half years later, the intermediate court of appeals allowed her suit to 
333. Id. at *27. 
334. Hohndorfv. Watson, 482 N.W.2d 241,242 (Neb. 1992). 
335. Id. 
336. Id. at 243. 
337. Id. at 244. 
338. See id. at 242, 244. 
339. Id. at 244. 






346. Id. at 228. 
347. Id. at 226. 
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proceed on the ground she was not a party barred by law from questioning the 
validity of the adoption decree.348 
In a 2001 New York case in which adoption was not contemplated before 
the birth, it appears that, as in the Kansas case recounted at length in Part II, 
the mother's consent was quickly taken and acted upon despite the fact that 
she was clearly experiencing a particularly high level of ambivalence.349 
During her pregnancy and on the day the child was born, the eighteen-year-old 
mother expressed her desire to keep the child/sO but the next day she executed 
a document surrendering custody to an adoption agency after a Department of 
Social Services worker told her that the Department was going to file a neglect 
petition and seek temporary custody of her child "due to its concerns that [she] 
was unable to properly care for him."m According to the court, it was clear 
two days later that she intended to challenge the surrender.352 
B. Family and Resource Issues 
A "sadly familiar pattem,,,353 in the words of one court, involves a failure 
of the mother and either the father or family members to have adequately 
resolved differences and fully come to terms with the mother's situation.354 In 
348. Id. at 229. In a recent Missouri case, a Spanish-speaking mother met eight or nine 
times with an agency coordinator and an interpreter before the birth, gave her consent nine days 
after the birth at a hearing before a family court commissioner, and then attempted orally to 
withdraw her consent during the following three or four days. Baby Girl P. v. A.M., 159 
S. W.3d 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). The Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the case, holding 
that under the statute permitting withdrawal of consent until it is reviewed and accepted by a 
judge, there is no requirement that the withdrawal be in writing. Id. at 865. In Yopp v. Batt, 
467 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Neb. 1991), the birth mother's doctor directed her to an attorney before 
the birth, and the attorney arranged the adoption. On the second day after the birth, she signed 
the papers after declining a hospital social worker's offer to discuss the relinquishment. Id. at 
873. She testified in court that the next day "she told her mother that she felt she did the wrong 
thing and that her mother told her to think about it for awhile." Id. at 874. Three days later, she 
"indicated to her mother that she wanted the baby back." Id. at 874. She then told her father 
about the pregnancy and birth and with him, met with the attorney to say she wanted the baby 
back. Id. The denial of her writ of habeas corpus was affirmed. Id. at 871, 881. 
349. In re Baby Boy 0., 733 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). 
350. Id. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. at 771. The court found that she had revoked her consent within the thirty days 
permitted by the law applicable at that time, and therefore she was entitled to a best interests 
hearing to determine custody of the child. Id. 
353. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1004 (La. 1988). 
354. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see generally In re Adoption of Baby 
Doe, No. 03AP-917, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 666 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004), a case in 
which the court found that the birth parents were persuaded to withdraw consent after their 
parents learned of the birth and expressed strong disapproval and In re Adoption of Infant Boy, 
573 N.E.2d 753, 755, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), a case in which the court found that the birth 
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a 1988 Louisiana case, for example, an eighteen-year-old who had concealed 
her pregnancy for six months consented to the adoption a week after the birth 
of her child.355 Her parents had given her an ultimatum that she could not 
continue to live with them if she kept her child.356 When the lawyer who 
placed the child with the prospective adoptive parents came to the mother's 
house for her to execute the surrender, he brought his law partner to act as her 
attorney and advise her of her rights.357 She apparently had not been offered 
or received any counseling. Some time after she gave her consent, her parents 
"realized that [she] couldn't get over the loss of the child.,,358 They testified 
"that they had experienced a change of heart because of the suffering [she] had 
endured, that they regretted their actions ... , and that they now stood ready 
to support" her.359 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that her surrender was 
valid but remanded the case for a new best interests hearing, available at that 
time in Louisiana in the case of a timely revocation. 360 
In a 1998 Texas case in which a nineteen-year-old mother unsuccessfully 
appealed the termination of her parental rights, the mother had kept her 
pregnancy a secret from her family and had driven herself to the hospital, 
where she told staff members that she intended to place the child for 
adoption.361 Some hours after the birth, she met with a hospital social worker 
who discussed adoption procedures with her, "presented her with other 
options," and contacted a private adoption agency at the mother's request.362 
An agency representative telephoned the same day, and the following day 
another agency employee met with her at the hospital to "explain[] the 
adoption process and the legal documents necessary to initiate the process.,,363 
The third day after the birth, she signed the final papers, relinquishing the 
child to the agency.364 Shortly thereafter, following a "confrontation" when 
her parents received a bill from the hospital, she sought return of the child 
from the agency, which was in the process of placing the child with the 
adoptive family.365 The Court of Appeals of Texas held, inter alia, that the 
legislature intended "to make an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment 
mother's father initially insisted upon adoption but changed his mind in part due to pressure 
from his own parents. 
355. J.MP., 528 So. 2d. at 1004-05. 
356. Id. at 1005. 
357. Id. 
358. Pontiffv. Behrens, 518 So. 2d 23, 27 (La. Ct. App. 1987), affd in part by In re 
I.M.P., 528 So. 2d. 1002 (La. 1988). 
359. J.MP., 528 So. 2d at 1005. 
360. Id. at 1017. 
361. In re Baby Girl Bruno, 974 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 
362. Id. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. at 403. 
365. See id. 
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sufficient evidence on which the trial court can make a finding that tennination 
is in the best interest of the child. ,,366 
In another case in which the mother concealed her pregnancy and also had 
her first contacts about adoption after the birth, the mother was counseled by 
a hospital social worker.367 On the third day after the birth, she consented to 
an adoption by another hospital employee.368 The mother revoked her consent 
when her parents learned of the birth almost six weeks later but still within 
New York's forty-five-day revocation period.369 More than a year later, in a 
1989 decision, she was granted the right to a best interests hearing "at the 
convenience of counsel. ,,370 
In other cases, mothers who received some fonn of counseling while 
pregnant nevertheless similarly sought to revoke their consents after their 
families learned of the births. In a 1988 Utah case, a twenty-one-year-old 
woman contacted an agency three months before the birth and received about 
thirteen hours of counseling from the agency.371 She relinquished her rights 
in court thirty hours after the birth.372 A few days later, she "disclosed her 
pregnancy, the child's birth, and the planned adoption to her own mother .... 
She then contacted [the agency] seeking to revoke her consent.,,373 Her 
subsequently filed motion to set aside the consent was granted by the district 
court but vacated on appeal. 374 In a 1994 California case, the adoption agency 
representative discussed with the college freshman mother the possibility of 
raising the child and encouraged her to tell her parents about the birth.375 The 
mother refused to consider telling family or friends because "[s]he could not 
disappoint her parents. ,,376 When she eventually confided in them several 
months later, they "told her there must be something she could do to get the 
baby back."m She and the birth father unsuccessfully sought rescission of 
their relinquishments.378 
In the well-known, lengthy, and complex adoption contest known as the 
"Baby Jessica" case, which arose in Iowa in the early 1990s, the mother's 
parents knew of the pregnancy before the birth and opposed adoption.379 Cara 
Clausen, the unmarried mother who lived in the small fanning community in 
366. /d. at 405. 
367. In re Baby Girl B., 544 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964 (Sur. Ct. 1989). 
368. /d. 
369. Id. 
370. Id. at 966. 
371. In re Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916,917 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
372. Id. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. at 918, 920. 
375. Tyler v. Children's Home Soc'y, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 295-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
376. Id. at 296. 
377. Id. at 298. 
378. Id. at 298,315. 
379. Lucinda Franks, The War for Baby Clausen, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 1993, at 56. 
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which she had grown up, was "overcome with shame.,,380 The prospective 
adoptive parents' lawyer, according to scholar Joan Heifetz Hollinger, took her 
consent despite "classic warnings": 
These included [her] efforts to deny or hide her pregnancy until shortly 
before she gave birth, her reluctance to discuss her plans with close friends 
or family members, her insistence on relinquishing the infant despite her own 
mother's entreaties to the contrary, and her wariness of saying much about 
the circumstances of the conception or her relationship to the birth father. It 
is not surprising that several days after leaving the hospital, [she] began to 
regret her decision.381 
The counseling she received consisted of a brief telephone call with the 
hospital's social worker.382 The lawyer representing the prospective adoptive 
parents, Jan and Roberta DeBoer, "may have led [Clausen] to believe that he 
was representing [only the birth parents] .... Alternatively, he may have told 
[her] that he could represent and provide legal services to [both parties]. ,,383 
The lawyer first contacted her two days before the birth.384 One day before the 
birth, she misnamed as the father the man she had begun dating when she 
broke off her relationship with the child's actual biological father. 385 Forty 
hours after the birth, rather than the seventy-two hours required by Iowa law, 
she signed her consent. 386 Within three weeks, her parental rights were 
terminated and the DeBoers were awarded a temporary custody order.387 
Two days later she informed the biological father about the child.388 Truck 
driver Dan Schmidt, who was due to leave on a haul the next day, immediately 
asked his mother "to see what she could do to 'retrieve' the baby.,,389 
Approximately two weeks later, he filed a request to vacate the terminations 
of parental rights.390 In the meantime, Clausen had filed a petition to revoke 
the release of custody, 391 and the DeBoers had learned that she "want[ ed] Jessi 
back.,,392 The litigation between the two couples was conducted in the courts 
of Iowa and Michigan, where the DeBoers lived, and culminated in an 
380. Id. 




384. Marian L. Faupel, The "Baby Jessica Case" and the Claimed Conflict Between 
Children's and Parents' Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 285, 316-17 (1994). 
385. Id.at286,316-17. 
386. Id. at 316. 
387. Id.at317. 
388. Id. 
389. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992). 
390. Id. 
391. Faupel, supra note 384, at 317. 
392. ROBBY DEBOER, LOSING JESSICA 23 (1994). 
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unsuccessful application to the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of the Supreme 
Court of Michigan's order that the child be returned to her biological 
parents.393 The litigation had included an Iowa trial court order to return the 
child,394 issued when the child was eleven months old and affirmed eight 
months later by the Iowa Supreme Court.395 When the child was almost two 
and a half years old, the litigation was finally concluded and the child returned 
to Clausen and Schmidt, who had married and had had another child.396 
A failure of the mother and father to resolve their relationship lay behind 
a 1989 Florida case in which the father of the child opposed the adoption but 
had not agreed to marry the mother when she consented to adoption two days 
after the birth.397 The father then proposed marriage and came to Florida, 
where the mother had gone to give birth and place the child.398 "[W]ithin 
days" of giving her consent, the mother attempted to withdraw it.399 The 
parents subsequently married and unsuccessfully sought return of the child. 
The Florida Supreme Court ultimately held that the mother's consent was 
irrevocable and that the father had abandoned the child by failing to provide 
enough support during her pregnancy.400 
Economic distress and a lack of information about available help were the 
primary issues in a 1999 Florida case.401 The mother, who was unemployed 
and caring for a young daughter, contacted the adoption agency during her 
eighth month of pregnancy and consented to her son's adoption three days 
after his birth when she returned to the hospital and met with agency 
representatives in the hospitallobby.402 When she then returned home and told 
friends what had happened, they assured her they would support and help 
her.403 Less than twenty-four hours after signing the papers, she called the 
agency to say that she had changed her mind.404 When the Florida District 
Court of Appeal subsequently affirmed the denial of her motion to set aside 
the consent, she was living rent-free with a friend and working full-time as a 
housekeeper.405 The court, recognizing the "seemingly harsh result," 
suggested "that a 'cooling-off' period might be a wise option for the 
legislature to consider.'",o6 The Florida legislature in 2001 provided a 
393. Faupel, supra note 384, at 3 1 7-3 1. 
394. Id.at317. 
395. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241; Faupel, supra note 384, at 317. 
396. Faupel, supra note 384, at 331. 
397. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741,742-43 (Fla. 1989). 
398. Id. 
399. Id. at 743. 
400. See id. at 743-44, 749. 
401. See T.R. v. Adoption Servs., Inc., 724 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
402. Id. 
403. Id. at 1236. 
404. Id. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. at 1237. 
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revocation period in agency adoptions of three business days or until 
placement with adoptive parents, whichever is later.407 In independent 
adoptions in which placements are made directly from the hospital, the 
legislature provided that irrevocable consent could not be given for forty-eight 
hours or until the mother is fit to be released, whichever is earlier.408 
C. Best Interests Determinations 
A class of cases has arisen under state laws that permit withdrawal of 
consent if a court finds it to be in the child's best interest. A number of 
jurisdictions include the possibility of a best interests determination as a 
safeguard during the time between the execution of an irrevocable consent or 
the expiration of a revocation period and the entry of an interlocutory or final 
adoption decree.409 New York, however, frames its law differently. When 
consent has been given extrajudicially, mothers have forty-five days "to 
revoke" their consent, but their revocation triggers a best interests 
determination in which they enjoy no preference, rather than automatic return 
of the child.4lO Alabama also provides that revocation within fourteen rather 
than five days triggers a best interests determination.411 
It would not be surprising if a mother had difficulty appreciating that her 
"right to revoke" does not encompass a right to raise her child, especially 
when the mother is not educated in the law, has just given birth, and is in the 
stressful situation of considering placing her child for adoption. New York 
case law suggests mothers find the system at least confusing, if not actually 
misleading. In a 1999 New York case, for example, the birth parents claimed 
they "subjectively believed that they could unconditionally revoke their 
consents and automatically regain custody" during the revocation period, but 
the court found that a "failure to understand all of the legal ramifications of 
407. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(7)(a) (Supp. 2005). 
408. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4)(b). The law has been changed again since then; in all 
types of adoptions, a birth mother may not consent until forty-eight hours after the birth or "the 
day the birth mother has been notified in writing, either on her patient chart or in release 
paperwork, that she is fit to be released from the licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is 
earlier." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082( 4)(b). In the case ofa newborn, the consent is irrevocable. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4)(b). 
409. These jurisdictions include, for example, Alaska (until decree), Arkansas (until 
interlocutory decree), Hawaii (after consent and placement and until decree), Indiana (until final 
decree), Nebraska (until agency takes full responsibility or until independent adoption is final), 
New Hampshire (until interlocutory decree), North Dakota (until final decree), and Ohio (until 
interlocutory decree or, if none, until final decree). I ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 6, at app. I-A; Nat'l Council for Adoption, supra note 6; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 
25.23.070 (Michie 2004); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 578-2(f), 578-12 (2003). 
410. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(3)(a), (4)(a)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 2005). 
411. ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-13 (1992). 
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such a consent does not provide a basis to void it.'>412 In a case three years 
earlier, the court found the mother's "alleged confusion concerning the 
meaning and effect of the extrajudicial consent [was] insufficient to warrant 
its vacatur.'>413 
In best interests contests with prospective adoptive parents, mothers are 
likely to fare poorly. As a Florida court cautioned rhetorically, "[h]ow many 
parents could potentially be shown in a legal proceeding to be less good for 
their children than certain other would-be adoptive parents if the courts were 
empowered in such a proceeding to cause the adoption of children on that 
basisT>414 Mothers are at a further disadvantage because a widespread failure 
to expedite contested adoption litigation means that the child may have 
remained with the adoptive parents for a lengthy period, developing an 
attachment that will weigh against return of the child. "When the natural 
mother changes her mind and litigation is instituted," a majority of the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed, "there will be a considerable passage of time before 
there is any resolution," during which "strong ties and emotional attachments" 
form between the child and adoptive parents,4lS ties that will be "as traumatic, 
if not more so" to sever than "the ties between the child and the natural 
parents.'>416 A justice dissenting in part opposed the court's decision to 
substitute a best interests standard for its previous estoppel rule.417 He wrote 
that the delay is "wholly attributable to the system" and complained, "It 
borders on the asinine for this Court to issue an opinion ... critical of the time 
delay ... while at the same time it has not bothered to make any rule which 
will expedite appeals in adoption cases.'>418 
Mothers are often unmarried, less settled, and less prosperous than the 
prospective adoptive parents. The attitudes they may face in court are 
reflected in the statement of a prominent family law scholar: "The transaction 
costs added by legislatures to protect natural parents' custodial rights and 
ensure suitability of adoptive couples hurt more children than they assist. 
Virtually all couples trying to adopt children are suitable.'>419 She continues, 
412. In re AdoptionofBabyU., 693 N.Y.S.2d 118,120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)(emphasis 
added). 
413. In re Adoption ofJarrett, 637 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Similarly, 
mothers in cases in which adoptions would not be finalized for six months have claimed that 
they thought they could reclaim their children during that period. See, e.g., Hohndorf v. 
Watson, 482 N.W.2d 241, 242,244 (Neb. 1992). 
414. In re Adoption of Baby Girl "C," 511 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
415. In re B.D., 723 P.2d 829, 836 (Idaho 1986). 
416. Id. at 834. 
417. Id. at 839 (Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
418. Id. at 838 (Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
419. Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect o/Transactions Costs on the Market/or Babies, 18 
SETON HALL LEGIS. 1.553,558-59 (1994). The focus of the article "veers away from natural 
parental rights and moves toward what is in most cases de facto, rather than preemptively, best 
for children." Id. at 559. In questioning "whether the focus on the rights of natural mothers is 
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"'Best interests' cannot always function because a home with two loving 
parents is the best placement for children-any other situation is always 
second best.''''2o As discussed in Part IV, the prospective adoptive parents may 
elicit greater sympathy than the mother, given the "adversity in their effort to 
adopt children.''''21 The mother may face disapproval because she considered 
placing her child for adoption and then changed her mind. As Gritter 
observes: 
How curious [it is] that one moment these critics admire her contemplation 
of adoption and consider it a sign of maturity, and the next [moment] they 
consider it a cause for concern. The proposed act that one day was regarded 
as a "loving choice" is the next [day] referred to as "unloading 
responsibility. ,,422 
It appears from the generally brief analyses in reported appellate opinions 
that mothers fare poorly in comparison with married, more settled, and more 
prosperous prospective parents. In a 2000 New York case, for example, the 
mother was described as "nomadic," while the adoptive parents had "stable 
relationships.''''23 The evidence showed that "the biological mother had led a 
nomadic, unstable life, while the adoptive parents demonstrated the ability to 
establish and maintain continuous and stable relationships, and [were] far 
better suited to meet the day-to-day and life-long physical, emotional, and 
material needs of the child.''''24 In a 1989 case in Ohio, the court favored the 
prospective adoptive parents' "ideal situation.''''25 Reversing the trial court's 
best interests determination in favor of the mother, the appellate court 
discussed relations with the father and among members of the mother's 
family.426 It noted the prospective adoptive parents' reliance on a 
psychologist's report that, "[w]hile not disparaging to the natural mother, ... 
concluded that the natural mother's situation ... [did] not compare with the 
almost ideal situation in which the adoptive parents [could] raise a child. ,"'27 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals in a 1990 case affirmed a decision that 
disfavored a single mother who was planning to work and go to school, relying 
appropriate," the author simply assumes, without analysis, that a state system with a short 
revocation period can guarantee voluntary consents-that "[0 ]nce the state guarantees that the 
birth mother's consent is voluntarily made, a short revocation period will suffice." Id. at 578. 
420. Id. at 560. 
421. Id. at 564. 
422. GRIITER, supra note 97, at 101; see generally Cahn, supra note 171 (examining past 
and present cultural images of birth mothers). 
423. In re Baby Boy M., 703 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
424. Id. 
425. In re Adoption ofInfant Boy, 573 N.E.2d 753,758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). 
426. Id. at 757-58. 
427. Id. at 758. 
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on her mother for child care.428 The court compared the twenty-three-year-old 
unwed mother, who was raising her first child and had placed a second child 
in an open adoption, with the prospective adoptive parents, a thirty-year-old 
ambulance driver and his forty-two-year-old homemaker wife, the mother of 
a twenty-one-year-old son from a previous marriage.429 The mother lived with 
her parents, who had been under some financial strain, and she would have 
had to depend on her mother to help look after her children,43o whereas the 
adoptive parents could "provide [the infant] with a suitable home" and it was 
"not contested that they [would] do their best for the child.,,431 
Other opinions appear to focus simply on the fitness of the prospective 
adoptive parents. Two recent Ohio appellate panels, approving trial courts' 
best interests decisions in favor of adoptive parents, report only the findings 
about the adoptive parents, findings that indicate stable marriages and 
finances. The court in the 1999 case explains that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion because the adoptive parents "demonstrated to the trial court the 
stability of their marriage and of [the father's] employment. [They] had 
previously adopted, and were raising, a biracial child.'>432 In a 2003 case, the 
appellate court stated that the trial court found the six-month-old child "had 
bonded with the adoptive family, the child was thriving in her current 
placement, the adoptive parents were financially stable and able to provide 
stability and permanency, and both were in good health.'>433 Under Texas case 
law, a mother's affidavit of relinquishment is itself "sufficient evidence on 
which the trial court can base a finding that termination is in the best interest 
of the child. ,>434 
In contrast to most of the more recent opinions around the country, as well 
as to subsequent New York statutory law,435 the approach described by the 
New York Court of Appeals in the highly publicized 1971 Scarpetta case 
favored mothers if they were not found to be unfit or to have improper 
motivations: "In no case ... maya contest between a parent and nonparent 
resolve itself into a simple factual issue as to which affords the better 
surroundings, or as to which party is better equipped to raise the child. ,>436 The 
428. In re Adoption of Griggs, No. 89-159-55, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35, at *4-5, *10 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1990). 
429. Id. at *4-10. 
430. See id. at *4, *10. 
431. Id.at*10. 
432. In re Infant Male Jackson, Nos. C-980077, C-990008, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5179, 
at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1999). 
433. In re Adoption of Baby Doe, No. 03AP-917, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 666, at *8 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Feb. 17,2004). 
434. Denman v. Alternatives in Motion, No. 14-99-01262-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 
336, at *4-5 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 18,2001). 
435. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(6)(d)(v) (McKinney Supp. 2005). 
436. People ex rei. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787,792 (N.Y. 
1971). 
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mother's change of mind "'is not an evil thing'" and "'is to be accorded great 
sympathy, and, in a proper case, encouragement and favorable action. ",437 
D. Unenforceable Open Adoption Agreements 
Open adoption arrangements are preferred by many mothers considering 
placing their infants for adoption. For these mothers, a promise of openness 
may influence their decisions to place their children as well as their selection 
of prospective adoptive parents.438 In open adoption arrangements, adoptive 
parents, and often adopted children, have contacts with birth parents through 
photographs, letters, telephone calls, or visits.439 Despite the increasing 
publicity such arrangements are receiving and their apparently increasing 
popularity, they are enforceable only to some degree and in some 
circumstances in fewer than twenty states.440 Some of the state statutes apply 
only to adoptions of children from the child welfare system, to adoptions by 
relatives, or to stepparent adoptions.441 Under most of the statutes that make 
agreements enforceable, the laws include a presumption that the agreements 
are enforceable unless there are grounds for modification.442 
The potential problems are obvious when an open adoption agreement is 
unenforceable. In a recent Texas case, the court held that a nineteen-year-old 
mother's consent was involuntary and wrongfully procured because the 
adoption agency's assurances that she would remain in the child's life were "at 
worst deceptive and at best vague.'>443 There was no evidence that she "was 
ever told that the post-adoption plan could not be legally enforced," and the 
agency admitted in the litigation that the post-adoption plan was an "empty 
promise.'>444 Similarly, a 1997 Kansas case appears to have been marked by 
conflict and confusion regarding post-adoption contact. At a time when the 
437. Id. (quoting People ex rei. Anonymous v. N.Y. Foundling Hosp., 232 N.Y.S.2d 479, 
483 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962». The child in this case was not returned to the mother because the 
prospective adoptive parents fled to Florida, where the courts, refusing to enforce the New York 
custody order, found it was in the child's best interests to remain with the adoptive parents. 
Scarp etta v. DeMartino, 254 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 262 So. 
2d 442 (Fla. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. lOll (1972). 
438. See, e.g., PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 207-17; Suein L. Hwang, Us. Adoptions Get 
Easier, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2004, at DI; Gabrielle Glaser, Open Adoptions Bind Lives 
Through a Baby, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 21, 2004, at 15; see also GRITTER, supra note 97, at 
40-41 (discussing the potential emotional benefits of open adoptions). 
439. CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 142. 
440. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post-Adoption Contact Statutes: Part I: Adoption 
with Contact, ADOPTION Q., Nov. 4, 2000, at 81, 82 (describing and comparing the various 
adoption with contact statutes). 
441. Id. at 84-86. 
442. Id. at 84. 
443. Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 753, 762, 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
444. Id. at 762. 
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same attorney was representing both the birth mother and the prospective 
adoptive parents,445 the birth mother discussed with the attorney her "wish to 
have continued contact,,,446 although she knew that any agreement about 
contact would not be legally binding.447 When the adoptive parents' attorney 
later briefed her new, separate attorney, the attorney did not mention her wish 
for contact. 448 She claimed in court that when she consented, "she believed 
that the adopting parents had agreed to her future visitation[].'>449 The 
appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to set aside her consent, noting 
that there was "disputed evidence ... as to whether there was any agreement 
regarding visitation" and that the adopting parents testified that there was no 
such agreement.450 
VII. PRESCRIPTIONS 
The best I can do is to repeat my sense that when independent 
adoptions succeed they do so because they give expression to the 
autonomous and informed decisions of the parties, and that the search 
for ways to insure that those decisions are indeed autonomous and 
informed is a critically important one. 451 
Joan Heifetz Hollinger 
Laws governing mothers' consents should aim not only to require but also 
to create incentives for following best practices in adoption. In the litigation 
described in Part VI, the states' legal systems apparently failed to do so. The 
mothers often lacked accurate and complete information about the law, their 
alternatives to adoption, and the effects they might experience after 
relinquishing their children. The mothers lacked unbiased counseling services 
or any counseling services at all. When they consented, they often had failed 
to come to adequate understandings with the fathers of the children or with 
family members. In almost all of the cases, they consented very shortly after 
the birth, often in the hospital within hours or a few days after giving birth. 
445. In re Adoption ofN.A.P., 930 P.2d 609, 617 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996). 
446. Id. at 613. 
447. Id. 
448. See id. at 612. 
449. Id. at 616. 
450. Id. In an earlier Kansas case in which the mother was offered but did not have 
separate counsel, the mother, before signing consent, asked the attorney why the documents did 
not mention the visitation that she expected to have with the child. See In re Adoption of 
J.H.G., 869 P.2d 640, 642 (Kan. 1994). He told her that "visitation was not supposed to be 
addressed in the documents, but that it was an issue between her and the adoptive parents." Id. 
In the lawsuit, in which the mother sought to set aside the adoption, the trial court found no 
agreement had been reached between the parties except an agreement that there would be no 
visitation for a minimum of six months after birth. See id. at 644. 
451. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Reflections on Independent AdoptiOns, in LEGALAoVOCACY 
FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH: REFORMS, TRENDS, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 366,386 (1986). 
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Legal safeguards are unnecessary for infant adoptions conducted in a 
humane and ethical manner; they are essential for those that may not be. The 
most critical observers argue that we should transform our diverse and 
"[s]urprisingly loosely regulated,,452 system into a social service in which 
payments by adoptive parents play no part. The hope for such a 
transformation seems quixotic in light of our long history of private agency 
and independent adoptions, as well as the powerful, numerous, and entrenched 
interests participating in the adoption market. As Pertman writes, "That's a 
worthy ideal, but it's probably unrealistic in our devoutly capitalistic 
society.'>453 
A number of the available legal safeguards, short of transforming adoption 
into a strictly social service, could be more widely enacted at little or no cost 
to the states. Other legal safeguards, while worthwhile, are more costly and 
complex, as well as inherently limited in their ability to promote deliberate 
decisionmaking and finality. With respect to legal representation, states 
should make clear by statute that attorneys may not simultaneously represent 
adoptive parents and birth parents. This will help to ensure that birth parents 
know that their interests are not and may not be represented by the adoptive 
parents' attorney. It is not likely many states will decide to require separate 
representation because of the costs that are involved either for the adoptive 
parents or the state. In any event, although such representation presumably 
makes it more likely a mother will understand her legal rights, there is also a 
risk of a conflict of interest, as discussed in Part IV, when the attorney is paid 
by prospective adoptive parents. If more mothers decide to place their 
children for adoption, more work will be available for all attorneys involved 
in adoptions. 
Regardless of possible conflicts of interest, it is difficult to legislate the 
timing and quality of representation that a pregnant woman or a new mother 
will receive. The Kansas Court of Appeals found that its state law requiring 
representation for young mothers had been complied with in a case in which 
the prospective adoptive parents' attorney "less than an hour before the 
scheduled meeting [for signing consents] ... realized that under Kansas law, 
[the birth parents] were to be provided independent legal counsel.'>454 An 
attorney whose office was in the same suite was enlisted and briefed for five 
minutes.4SS He then advised the birth parents and took their consents,456 
satisfying the requirement that "a minor parent shall have the advice of 
independent legal counsel as to the consequences of the consent or 
relinquishment prior to its execution" and the attorney "shall be present at the 
452. Zeidler, supra note 65. 
453. PERTMAN, supra note 66, at 194. 
454. N.A.P., 930 P.2d at 612. 
455. Id. 
456. Id. 
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execution.,,457 As a concurring North Dakota Supreme Court justice wrote, 
"[ m ]eeting with the client immediately before a termination of parental rights 
hearing for the first and only time does not allay the perception of lack of 
independent counsel. It fortifies my concern that providing counsel under 
such circumstances is but a perfunctory observance of a meaningless ritual.'>458 
With respect to counseling services, there is at least potential utility in 
requiring that a number of counseling sessions be available, that the sessions 
be with a licensed social worker or therapist, and that the sessions be available 
both well in advance of giving consent and after consenting. Skilled and 
unbiased counseling is, as discussed in Part IV, an essential part of best 
practices. But as explained and illustrated at length above, this kind of 
counseling is far from guaranteed by most state law requirements. There are 
risks of conflicts of interest when the counseling is offered or arranged by the 
agency or individual handling the adoption, as well as when it is offered by 
other providers paid by the prospective adoptive parents. California attempts 
to minimize, but does not eliminate, this risk with statutory requirements. 
Birth parents in independent adoptions must be advised of their rights and 
offered three separate counseling sessions by an "adoption service 
provider,,,459 defined as a licensed agency or a licensed clinical social worker 
with five years of relevant experience.460 The counselor who advises the birth 
parents must not have any "contractual relationship with the adoptive parents, 
an attorney for the adoptive parents, or any other individual or . . . 
organization performing any type of services for the adoptive parents and for 
which the adoptive parents are paying a fee, except as relates" to the fee for 
the counseling.461 These requirements add costs. When a state strictly 
regulates counselors' qualifications, services, and affiliations, or itselfprovides 
counseling services, the state imposes or incurs substantial costs, a fact that 
helps explain why other states have not adopted such measures and why they 
are unlikely to do so. 
Increased costs and potential delays also reduce the number of states that 
would consider joining the ten states that still employ in some or all 
independent adoptions a procedure in which mothers appear in court to 
relinquish parental rights or give their consent. This procedure is 
457. Id. at 614. 
458. In re D.J.H., 40 1 N.W.2d 694, 703-04 (N.D. 1987) (Levine, J., concurring specially). 
459. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5(a), (d) (West 2004). The provider must also offer to 
interview the birth parent within ten working days after the placement of the child and 
immediately notify the state or delegated county agency if the birth parent is not interviewed 
or ifthere are any concerns regarding the placement. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.7(a)-(b) (West 
2004). The provider must assist the birth parent in obtaining return of the child if the birth 
parent wishes to revoke the consent. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.7(b). 
460. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8502(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 2005). Ifa service provider is not 
reasonably available, as defined by the statute, "independent legal counsel for the birth parent 
may serve as an adoption service provider." CAL. FAM. CODE § 8502(b). 
461. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5(e). 
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recommended as a key, if imperfect, safeguard by Hollinger,462 and its efficacy 
is suggested by the relative paucity of reported disputes in which the procedure 
was employed. Vermont added this procedure in a 1995 overhaul of its 
adoption law.463 The state now requires that consents to adoption by 
individuals and relinquishments to agencies must be signed in the presence of 
"a judge of a court that has jurisdiction over adoption proceedings" or "a 
person appointed by a probate judge to take consents or relinquishments. ,,464 
If the consent is executed by a minor, it must "be signed in the presence of the 
judge before whom the proceeding is pending.'>465 
As suggested by the Part VI analyses of problems in practice, two of the 
most effective and practicable safeguards in the case of infant adoptions are 
similar to effective safeguards in the very different case of consumer 
contracts:466 information requirements and consent timing rules. At very low 
cost, states can, and some states do, require that specific information be 
provided at specified times, orally and in specific written formats, and that 
provision and receipt of the information be confirmed in writing. For 
example, Vermont requires, among other things, that (1) a parent "shall have 
been informed of the meaning and consequences of adoption" and "the 
availability of personal and legal counseling";467 (2) the person before whom 
the consent or relinquishment is executed must certify both that he or she 
orally explained the contents and consequences of executing the document and 
that the person signing the consent read or was read the document and was 
offered a copy;468 and (3) the consent contain "specific instructions as to how 
462. Hollinger advises: 
The attention of lawmakers should be directed . . . at insuring that consents, when 
executed, are consents. Perhaps in all adoptions-agency as well as 
independent-voluntary relinquishments should be executed before a neutral party (judge? 
court officer?) who not only witnesses the signing offorms, but more importantly, queries 
the birth parent about her understanding of the consequences of her action. Risks are 
posed, however, even by this procedure. Not the least of these is that the birth mother's 
resolve to relinquish her child will be subject to extensive and inappropriate scrutiny. 
Hollinger, supra note 451, at 377-78. 
463. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405 historical note (2002). 
464. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405(a). 
465. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405(b). 
466. See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG ET AL., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 1.08 (Theodore 
Eisenberg ed., 2004) (describing truth in lending rescission rights for credit transactions in 
which a home is taken as collateral, other than transactions for purchase of the home). The 
contrast between consumer law protections and some adoption consent provisions was pointed 
out in a Florida decision: "It is ironic that a potential condominium purchaser's contract with 
a developer is voidable within 15 days from the date of execution." Hindman v. Bischoff, 534 
So. 2d 743, 745 n. * (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
467. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-404(e) (2002). 
468. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-405(d);seea/so VT.STAT.ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-406(2002) 
(specifying what information and what kind of statements must be contained in consents and 
relinquishments). 
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to revoke the consent or relinquishment.,>469 Florida's statute is an example of 
a law that includes a disclosure form, which must be provided to all 
prospective birth and adoptive parents and includes statements about legal 
representation, consents, alternatives to adoption, and the right to 
counseling.470 California's statute directs its Department of Social Services to 
"prescribe the format and process for advising birth parents of their rights" and 
to include specific information about alternatives to adoption, alternative types 
of adoptions, and rights to legal representation and counseling.471 
Even more effective than information requirements, and equally 
practicable, are rules that prohibit giving hasty irrevocable consents. Such 
rules require no or only modest expenditures. In the period after birth and 
before consent is final, an infant may be cared for by the mother, the father, or 
both parents, either independently or with assistance, or by foster parents. 
Proponents of very quick irrevocable consents have not demonstrated either 
short-term or long-term harm from a period of a few days or weeks between 
a child's birth and placement in an adoptive home.472 In any event, such 
speedy consents are not necessary for early placements into adoptive homes. 
If a child's parents and the prospective adoptive parents are confident that the 
parents' decisions are final, and if they all wish for an early placement, the 
child's parents can place the child in the adoptive home before consent has 
been given or becomes final. 473 Speedy consents are also unnecessary to 
ensure suitable adoptive placements for children, given the great demand for 
healthy newborns.474 
Prohibiting hasty consents creates incentives for service providers to 
follow best practices in adoption. Service providers and prospective adoptive 
parents face potentially great costs, financial and emotional, when a mother 
who has tentatively agreed to adoption decides not to place her child. The 
469. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-406(a)(5). 
470. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.085 (West Supp. 2005). 
471. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5 (West 2004). 
472. See supra Part IV. 
473. For example, the Uniform Adoption Act specifies procedures for placement of a child 
before a consent is executed: 
[T]he parent or guardian who places the minor shall furnish to the prospective adoptive 
parent a signed writing stating that the transfer of physical custody is for purposes of 
adoption and that the parent or guardian has been informed of the provisions ofthis [Act] 
relevant to placement for adoption, consent, relinquishment, and termination of parental 
rights. The writing must authorize the prospective adoptive parent to provide support and 
medical and other care for the minor pending execution of the consent within a time 
specified in the writing. The prospective adoptive parent shall acknowledge in a signed 
writing responsibility for the minor's support and medical and other care and for returning 
the minor to the custody of the parent or guardian if the consent is not executed within the 
time specified. 
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §2-102(d), 9 U.L.A. 31 (1992). 
474. See supra Part III. 
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chance she will do so is greatest if she has been inadequately counseled or 
improperly pressured but then is afforded adequate time to consider and to 
reconsider her decision. Therefore, if hasty consents are not permitted, 
adoption services providers and prospective adoptive parents have a powerful 
incentive to follow best practices from the outset. These practices facilitate 
deliberate decisionmaking and make adoption more of a cooperative process 
than a proprietary tussle. In other words, prohibiting hasty consents promotes 
best practices among those who might be most tempted to disregard 
them-whether for philosophical, religious, emotional, or financial 
reasons-in order to meet the compelling desires of prospective adoptive 
parents. 
The most advantageous laws provide both a period of time after birth 
before which consent may be given and a subsequent period of time for 
revocation. Mothers who feel they have sufficiently deliberated and firmly 
decided on adoption may give their legal consent not long after birth and then 
choose to neither entertain nor exercise their right to revoke. They may "walk 
away," knowing that the adoption will be completed without further 
participation on their part. For mothers in less favorable circumstances, the 
revocation period offers an opportunity for reflection as they recover from 
giving birth and begin to experience the effects that the decision will have on 
themselves and their families. To successfully provide an opportunity for 
reflection, the right to revoke must be unqualified. Any period of time during 
which withdrawing consent could trigger a best interest contest should come 
after the period during which the mother has an unqualified right to revoke her 
consent. 
To determine the optimal periods of time, there is no magic formula that 
perfectly balances the need for deliberate and final decisions with the need to 
establish children in permanent homes. Vermont departed from the trend in 
some states to shorten periods. In Vermont, mothers may not consent until 
thirty-six hours after the birth, and they have a twenty-one-day revocation 
period after they give consent.475 If the period before a mother may consent 
is four to seven days, most mothers will be out of the hospital, free of the 
strongest effects of medication, and probably more sensible of their right not 
to place their children despite any tentative arrangements made before birth. 
If the subsequent, unqualified revocation period is approximately three weeks, 
the total period of approximately four weeks will still be shorter than the 
period in the Australian and European models described in Part II, and shorter 
than the postpartum period of six to eight weeks between birth and the time 
when the mother's body has returned as closely as possible to its pre-pregnant 
state.476 It may, nevertheless, be long enough for most mothers to recover 
from the effects of childbirth and long enough for counteracting to some extent 
475. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-404(a) (2002). 
476. THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 1476 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 
2003). 
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a lack of adequate information, family consultation, or supportive counseling. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Infant adoptions are momentous, life altering events, not only for the child 
and both sets of parents, but also for the extended families. The future of any 
adoptive family is just as uncertain as it is for any biological family. We 
cannot predict how a child's personality, interests, and talents will mesh with 
those of the child's parents and siblings, or how a child will respond to having 
been placed for adoption. We cannot know what opportunities a family will 
enjoy and what challenges it will face. Adoptive families, like biological 
families, are unfortunately not immune from divorce, death, emotional 
instability, substance abuse, and violence. When a state places its legal 
imprimatur on the unmaking of one family and the making of another, the state 
should at least insure to the greatest extent possible that all the individuals 
involved have followed or have been afforded "best practices." These are the 
practices that ethics and humanity demand. For mothers considering placing 
their children for adoption, skilled, unbiased counseling is invaluable; 
complete, well-communicated information is indispensable; and time is, 
perhaps, "the wisest counsellor of all. ,,477 
477. PLUTARCH, PERICLES (John Dryden trans.), available at 
hnp://c\assics.mit.eduIPlutarchiperic\es.html (last visited May 7, 2005). 
